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IF YOU GRANT IT, THEY WILL COME: THE HISTORY AND
ENDURING LEGAL LEGACY OF MIGRATORY DIVORCE
Michael J. Higdon*
Abstract
Fifty years ago, California became the first state to enact no-fault
divorce, making it easier than ever before for individuals to dissolve
unsuccessful marriages. Soon, every state would follow suit, and over the
years, much has been written about this national shift in the law of divorce.
What has thus far escaped scrutiny, however, is one of the prime casualties
of that switch—the phenomenon of migratory divorce. This failure is
somewhat ironic given that, although no-fault divorce has existed for just
over fifty years, migratory divorce played a prominent role in American
legal history for well over a century. Migratory divorce is the process
through which people who lived in states where a divorce was difficult to
obtain would temporarily relocate to another state—one with more liberal
divorce laws—in order to satisfy that state’s domicile requirement to
obtain a divorce there. Divorce in hand, those people typically returned
home to continue life as unmarried persons. Many states, however,
opposed recognizing such divorces, giving rise to multiple Supreme Court
opinions dealing with when a state is constitutionally required to
recognize such a decree. Contemporaneous with that debate, a large
number of Americans fiercely opposed the practice of migratory divorce
altogether, fearing the impact it would have on the sanctity of marriage.
As a result, there were several proposals over the years for dealing with
this “problem,” primarily involving constitutional amendments and
uniform laws. In light of this history, it is the position of this Article that
the era of migratory divorce offers an invaluable resource for those
studying not only the development but also the continuing evolution of
American family law. Accordingly, this Article chronicles that legal
phenomenon, offering a detailed analysis of the various social, legal, and
political influences that ultimately shaped this unique time in American
history. The purpose in doing so is, first, to ensure that this fascinating
period in American history is not forgotten, but more important, to distill
the legal lessons produced by this era—lessons that are highly instructive
to contemporary scholars, courts, and policymakers alike as they continue
to wrestle with the emerging problems facing the law of domestic
relations.
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1

[T]he States whose laws were the most lax as to length of residence
required for domicil, as to causes for divorce, and to speed of procedure
concerning divorce, would in effect dominate all the other States.
Haddock v. Haddock2
I. INTRODUCTION
Writing in 1955, James Sumner observed that “[t]he recognition of divorce
decrees has perhaps created more concern in the United States than any other legal
issue.”3 Today, such questions have largely been settled and, thus, the law of
domestic relations is now consumed with other, more pressing issues like (to name
a few) determining legal parentage in the face of evolving technology and societal
mores,4 the extent to which cohabitants should be afforded marriage-like
protections,5 and how, in the wake of Obergefell, states are to achieve true marriage

1

During its heyday as a divorce destination, Reno actively promoted its divorce
industry. One way they did so was by selling postcards that Reno’s divorce tourists could
send home to friends and family. Pictured is one such postcard from circa 1942, featuring a
drawing by cartoonist Lew Hymers. Divorce Seeker and Cowboy, RENO DIVORCE HIST.,
https://renodivorcehistory.org/library/divorce-seeker-and-cowboy/
[https://perma.cc/ANX5-PHJZ] (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
2
201 U.S. 562, 574 (1906).
3
James D. Sumner, Jr., Full Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees—Present Doctrine
and Possible Changes, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 (1955).
4
See infra note 358 and accompanying text.
5
See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
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equality.6 Nonetheless, bearing in mind philosopher George Santayana’s admonition
that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it[,]”7 the
question arises as to whether those grappling with these contemporary issues might
benefit from revisiting earlier periods in American law—specifically the one to
which Sumner was referring. After all, the legal issues posed by those events
generated a considerable paper trail, including numerous Supreme Court opinions
that span more than seventy years,8 as well as numerous proposals for uniform state
laws and even constitutional amendments.9 It is the position of this Article that the
evolving law of domestic relations would indeed benefit from a look back, not only
to the issue of divorce recognition but also to the fascinating historical events that
made that question such a hot-button issue in the first place.
Essentially, it would all begin in 1861 when the territory of Nevada adopted a
law that, although quite innocuous on its surface, would eventually cause people the
world over to associate Reno, Nevada, with “quickie” divorces. The law in question
set the territory’s residency requirement at six months.10 Nevada did so in light of
the fact that, at the time, it had many new residents—most of whom were miners—
pouring into the territory, and the territory wanted to make sure that these new
arrivals did not have to wait too long before they could vote in territorial elections.11
Of course, by obtaining residency, those individuals also gained access to a whole
host of state rights, including, most notably, the right to petition for divorce—an
opportunity that would soon catch the eyes of many who lived outside the state.
To understand why the right to petition for divorce garnished so much attention,
one must first realize that throughout the nineteenth century, public attitudes towards
divorce were changing, with fewer and fewer people thinking of marriage as a legal

6

See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption PostObergefell, 84 UMKC L. REV. 663, 664 (2016); Lee-ford Tritt, The Stranger-to-theMarriage Doctrine: Judicial Construction Issues Post-Obergefell, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 373,
374 (2019).
7
7 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS:
INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN COMMON SENSE bk. I 172 (Marianne S. Wokeck & Martin
A. Coleman eds., 2011).
8
See infra Section III.A.
9
See infra Section III.B.
10
See ALICIA BARBER, RENO’S BIG GAMBLE: IMAGE AND REPUTATION IN THE BIGGEST
LITTLE CITY 54 (2008) (referencing the “1861 law that provided for the conferral of Nevada
territorial (and later, state) residency after just six months of continuous residence”).
11
See id. at 54 (describing the motivation behind the law as “hasten[ing] the ability of
transient miners and other new arrivals to vote in territorial and, later, state elections”); see
also NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 122 (1962) (explaining how mining territories passed laws of this sort in light of “the
necessary mobility of frontier towns, where prospectors and other adventurers move in, try
their luck, and often roll on again without staying more than a year in any locality. If such
communities were to have voters, they had to specify periods of residence in terms of months
rather than years”).
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status that could only be terminated upon the death of one of the spouses.12 The laws,
however, were not necessarily following suit,13 and a number of Americans found
themselves desiring a divorce but living in states where they could not obtain one.14
Not all states, however, were that restrictive,15 and as a result, those who lived in
stricter states began to realize that other forums might offer some relief. Some states
became particularly attractive. Specifically, those that 1) maintained short residency
requirements and 2) permitted divorce on more liberal grounds16 were seen by many
as being well worth the expense of a temporary relocation. And where individuals
saw a path to divorce, states saw a path to tremendous revenue. During the peak of
migratory divorce in the mid-twentieth century, for instance, Nevada realized
revenues of several million dollars a year.17 For that reason, over the next hundred
years, various cities across several states would come to be characterized as “divorce
mills,”18 each competing for the lucrative migratory divorce trade until, that is, the
entire practice began to die out—largely due to the advent of no-fault divorce—in
the late 1960s.19
Since that time, migratory divorce has come to be regarded as largely a
historical relic, one that today receives relatively little attention from legal
12
See A. Rachel Camp, Pursuing Accountability for Perpetrators of Intimate Partner
Violence: The Peril (and Utility?) of Shame, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1677, 1703 (2018) (“Divorce
became more accepted in the late 19th century. . . .”); JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE
W. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 163
(2011) (“Changing ideology, changing culture, and changing gender roles increased the
demand for divorce.”).
13
See Sumner, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that the rise of migratory divorce “indicates
that the law has not kept abreast of the times”); see also infra note 32 and accompanying
text.
14
Judith M. Stinson, The Right to (Same-Sex) Divorce, 62 CASE W. RESV. L. REV. 447,
455–56 (2011) (“Some states banned divorces outright, and, of those that granted divorces,
the more strict states, such as New York, permitted divorce only in cases of adultery.”).
15
See infra Section II.B.
16
At this point in history, no-fault divorce did not yet exist, and a person desiring a
divorce was required to prove that his or her spouse had somehow breached the marital
contract. See infra notes 60, 61, 71, and 73 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 155–159 and accompanying text.
18
See, e.g., Neil Ribner & Jason Ribner, United States: 1901 to 1950, in CULTURAL
SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1244, 1247 (Robert E. Emory ed., 2013) (using
the term “divorce mills” and defining it as “cities in liberal states that offered divorce like it
was another tourist attraction”).
19
See Helen Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era,
58 TEX. L. REV. 501, 523–24 (1980) (“The widespread acceptance of no-fault divorce has
also diminished substantially the importance of another evil the present rules were designed
to combat—migratory divorce.”); see also Developments in the Law: The Constitution and
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1198, 1245 (1980) (“With the widespread adoption of no-fault
divorce laws in recent years, however, the frequency of such migratory divorces has greatly
diminished, and such interstate jurisdictional squabbles have become rare.”) (citation
omitted).
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scholars.20 Even among the scholars who refer to this period in American law,21 none
have chronicled the rich history behind the phenomenon of migratory divorce, nor
has any delved into the complex social, legal, and political influences that would
coalesce to shape this unique period in American family law. And this failure is
problematic for two reasons. First, it is a truly captivating period in American legal
history, one that boasts an elaborate and colorful complexity with which many are
unfortunately unacquainted. Second, and most important, a number of contemporary
legal problems facing the law of domestic relations either owe their existence to the
various legal dilemmas that emerged as a result of migratory divorce or, even if not
directly arising from that practice, could nonetheless be better analyzed by
harnessing the lessons offered by that period in history.22 These contemporary
problems are far from being discrete issues of limited import, but instead include
such pervasive issues as the evolution of divorce as an individual right, the harms
that flow from family law’s failure to adapt to changing societal norms, the value
derived from uniform codes pertaining to the family, and the limitations imposed on
states by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.23 For all
those reasons, the era of migratory divorce deserves renewed attention.
The aim of this Article is two-fold: first, to chronicle the timeline of events
comprising this period in American legal history and, second, to analyze the impact
that history has played—and continues to play—in the development of the law of
domestic relations in the United States. In so doing, this Article is the first to offer a
detailed exploration of the various historical events that contributed to the prolific,
brazen forum shopping that has come to characterize this legal era.24 For instance,
20

See Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990
WIS. L. REV. 399, 479 (1990) (“[N]o-fault schemes now provide a common denominator
among the jurisdictions, and one hears little about migratory divorce resulting solely from
efforts to evade the law of the domicile.”); Jeanne Louise Carriere, “It’s Deja Vu All over
Again”: The Covenant Marriage Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1701, 1731 (1998) (“The relative uniformity of current divorce law has made
migratory divorce an irrelevancy.”).
21
See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 516–
25 (2008); Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage
and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87
(2004); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s
Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV.
2017 (2000); Shaakirrah R. Sanders, The Cyclical Nature of Divorce in the Western Legal
Tradition, 50 LOY. L. REV. 407 (2004); Kimberly Diane White, Covenant Marriage: An
Unnecessary Second Attempt at Fault-Based Divorce, 61 ALA. L. REV. 869, 882 (2010).
22
See infra Part IV.
23
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
24
Michael Boucai, Before Loving: The Lost Origins of the Right to Marry, 2020 UTAH
L. REV. 69, 137 (2020) (describing migratory divorce as “a species of forum shopping that
pitted jurisdictions with more restrictive divorce laws against those with less restrictive
rules”); Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting Responsibility Back into Marriage: Making a Case
for Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1225 (1993) (“Migratory divorce is
a species of forum shopping . . . .”).
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this Article chronicles not only the competition that unfolded among the states in the
race to attract out-of-state divorce business25 but also the strict divorce laws that
made migratory divorce such an attractive option in the first place.26 Likewise
included are contemporaneous reactions to this phenomenon, most of which were
quite critical, and the texts of various laws and Constitutional amendments that were
proposed to bring migratory divorce to an end.27 Finally, this Article includes an
analysis of the twelve decisions by the Supreme Court—decisions that spanned a
period of more than seventy years—dealing with the constitutional implications of
such divorces.28
To both accomplish these goals and to delineate the various historical elements,
this Article is organized into four parts. Part II begins with a discussion of divorce
laws as they existed at America’s founding up until the mid-nineteenth century when
couples began seizing upon migratory divorce as a solution to dissolving
unsuccessful marriages. Part II then chronicles the various states that attracted those
divorce seekers—some unintentionally, some purposefully—explaining why
Nevada ultimately emerged as the most successful. Part III turns to the legal
reactions to migratory divorce. It begins by discussing the long list of Supreme Court
cases that wrestled with the issue of when states were required, under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, to give effect to migratory divorces before then turning to the
various legal proposals aimed at ending the practice. Finally, Part IV traces the
impact of all this history on several contemporary issues within the field of family
law, noting the degree to which migratory divorce is relevant to the development of
each. Part IV next argues how understanding the relationship between these
contemporary issues and migratory divorce is crucial to courts, policymakers, and
scholars alike, enabling them to analyze these issues more effectively going forward.
II. HISTORY OF MIGRATORY DIVORCE
Migratory divorce has been defined as “a divorce granted to a person who has
left his home in one state and resorted temporarily to another state for the express
purpose of obtaining a divorce from its courts.”29 The practice has existed in some
form or another since the country’s founding, owing its emergence to the confluence
of several legal and social movements. However, as the country expanded westward
and Americans became more mobile, the practice grew exponentially.30 This rise in
migratory divorce was driven primarily by the growing demand for divorce and the
failure of some states to be responsive to that demand.31 As one Nevadan would
25

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.A.
27
See infra Section III.B.
28
See infra Section III.A.
29
David F. Cavers, Migratory Divorce, 16 SOC. FORCES 96, 97 (1937).
30
See infra Section II.B.
31
DEBORA ANN MACCOMB, TALES OF LIBERATION, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT:
DIVORCE OF THE REPRESENTATION OF WOMANHOOD IN AMERICAN FICTION, 1880–1920 128
26

2022]

MIGRATORY DIVORCE

301

answer—when asked how his state could justify granting a divorce after only six
weeks of residence (which was to be the shortest residency requirement any state
would adopt)—“You can’t change human nature by law. So what we’re trying to do
is to make human nature legal.”32
Nevada is, of course, the state most often associated with migratory divorce.
However, it was not until 1931 that Nevada lowered its residency requirement to six
weeks.33 By that time, several decades of competition among the states to attract outof-state divorce seekers had already passed.34 Further, that competition would play
on long after Nevada made that bold move. The purpose of this section then is to go
beyond Nevada and chronicle the broader history of migratory divorce in the United
States, from how it owes its origins to the earliest divorce laws of the American
colonies, to the various states that jockeyed for the revenue generated by these
“divorce tourists,”35 and finally to how it all unceremoniously ended in the late 1960s
with the advent of no-fault divorce.
A. Early Divorce Laws
The controversy that inevitably surrounds divorce has been shaping the law of
domestic relations in the United States for longer than the country has even officially
existed.36 As Judith Areen describes, “[t]he roots of American family law were
planted nearly four centuries ago when new England Puritans adopted both civil
marriage and divorce in clear violation of the laws of the Church of England.”37
When English settlers first arrived in what would eventually become the United
States, the Church of England “continued to adhere to the doctrine of
indissolubility.”38 That is not to say that people in England could not obtain a
divorce—they could, but it took (quite literally) an act of Parliament: “The only

(2000) (“The western states’ migratory divorce industry arose because, like any other
business, it responded to consumer demand for a particular product.”).
32
William G. Shepherd, Making Human Nature Legal, COLLIER’S: THE NATIONAL
WEEKLY, June 20, 1931, at 14.
33
See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
34
See RODRICK PHILLIPS, UNTYING THE KNOT: A SHORT HISTORY OF DIVORCE 160
(1991) (“The distinction of being the most popular divorce haven was shared by several
midwestern and western divorce states at different times.”).
35
See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 168–69 (“Today we have ecotourism, and sex tourism; in the past there was a flourishing business of divorce tourism.”).
36
See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 237–
38 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Several issues relevant to the
formation and dissolution of marriages have served historically as the subject of controversy
. . . .”).
37
Judith Areen, Uncovering the Reformation Roots of American Marriage and Divorce
Law, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 83 (2014).
38
MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 31 (1972).

302

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

possibility of remarriage before the death of the spouse of a prior marriage consisted
of the grant of a special privilege by the king in Parliament.”39
Early American settlers, however, brought with them the influence of protestant
reformers like Martin Luther and John Calvin, both of whom believed that “marriage
and divorce were civil concerns.”40 Incorporating those principles, the
Massachusetts Bay Colony began granting divorces as early as 1639.41 Although the
Puritans certainly did not encourage divorce, they nonetheless “feared that forcing
all estranged couples to remain harnessed by law would eventually undermine the
social harmony they were trying to achieve.”42 Other New England colonies soon
followed suit, with Connecticut granting its first divorce in 1655.43 In fact, the colony
of New Haven, which would eventually become part of the Connecticut colony, was
the first to adopt legislation listing the grounds for divorce—those grounds being
“adultery, desertion, and male impotence, or, in the tactful words of the legislators,
a husband’s failure to perform his ‘conjugall duty’ to his wife.”44 The remaining
New England colonies of Rhode Island and New Hampshire likewise granted
divorces during the colonial period.45
Not all colonies embraced the idea of divorce as a civil remedy.46 The southern
colonies in particular were quite hostile to the idea and continued to adhere to
“English thinking regarding divorce.”47 The reason the different colonies took such
39

Id.; see also GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 13 (1991) (noting
that under “English policy, established in the Act of 1534, [] only the legislature—
Parliament—could grant an absolute divorce”).
40
RILEY, supra note 39, at 11 (“Before migrating to the colonies in 1620, many
Separatists embraced Martin Luther’s and John Calvin’s belief that marriage and divorce
were civil concerns.”). For an excellent discussion of what Luther and Calvin had to say on
the subject, see Areen, supra note 37.
41
See Lynda Wray Black, The Long-Arm’s Inappropriate Embrace, 91 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1, 19 n.139 (2017) (“The first divorce in the United States was granted in Massachusetts
Bay in 1639 to Mrs. James Luxford on the grounds of bigamy.”).
42
See RILEY, supra note 39, at 10. The Puritans acceptance of divorce also sprung from
the fact that they celebrated sex inside of marriage. See Areen, supra note 37, at 70 (noting
that the divorce was seen as “the best way to prevent an innocent spouse in a failed marriage
from being forced to remain celibate for life”).
43
See CHRISTINA KASSABIAN SCHAEFER, THE HIDDEN HALF OF THE FAMILY: A
SOURCEBOOK FOR WOMEN’S GENEALOGY 75 (1999) (noting that the first Connecticut
divorce was granted “for three years’ desertion, seven years’ absence without word, cruelty,
fraudulent contract, and adultery”).
44
RILEY, supra note 39, at 18–19.
45
Colonial law in Rhode Island provided “that in case of adulterie, a generall or towne
magistrate may grant a bill of divorce against ye partie offendinge uppon ye demand of ye
partie offended,” whereas New Hampshire “followed the lead of neighboring
Massachusetts.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 39–41.
46
RILEY, supra note 39, at 34 (“During this period, each region of the new nation—the
South, Northeast, and West—embraced divorce with varying degrees of enthusiasm.”).
47
Id. at 26; see also Ayelet Hoffmann Libson, Not My Fault: Morality and Divorce
Law in the Liberal State, 93 TUL. L. REV. 599, 603 (2019) (“In America, the southern
colonies generally followed the English tradition . . . .”).
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disparate approaches to divorce stems not from geography but primarily from the
different religious denominations of early settlers.48 As one author describes,
“[t]hroughout the colonial period, the cultural and religious affiliations of colonies
often served as the determining factor in establishing the extent to which an
individual had access to the institution of divorce.”49 For instance, “[w]hen the first
Virginians arrived at Jamestown in 1607, they adhered to Anglican beliefs more
closely than did the Puritans and thus transplanted English policy prohibiting
divorce.”50 Religion likewise played a role in the middle colonies, which took a more
“scattered”51 approach given that “these settlements drew their population and their
customs from a variety of sources.”52 Pennsylvania, for example, was a Quaker
colony and, thus, “tended to restrain the granting of divorces,”53 even though it did
at one point employ divorce as a punishment for those who committed adultery.54
New Jersey, on the other hand, which was “[s]ettled by a great variety of colonists,
some of whom like the Dutch and the Puritans looked upon marriage as a dissoluble
civil contract,”55 took a rather liberal approach, even granting divorces by mutual
consent at one point.56 The role that religion would play in early divorce law is
notable because it would eventually set the stage for the growing demand for
migratory divorce as well as the inability of the states to agree on a solution to that
“problem.”57
Following the American Revolution, the newly formed states not only threw
off the shackle of English rule but, along with it, the previous limitations regarding
marital dissolution.58 Divorce soon became widely available throughout the United

48

See MARY SOMERVILLE JONES, AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE CHANGING
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1987) (“The reason for this regional variation is
to be found in the religious antecedents of the settlers.”).
49
Deborah L. Bauer, Colonial America, in CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 288, 289 (Robert E. Emery ed., 2013).
50
RILEY, supra note 39, at 25.
51
Id. at 23.
52
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 41; see also CLARE A. LYONS, SEX AMONG THE RABBLE:
AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF GENDER AND POWER IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, PHILADELPHIA,
1730–1830 35 (2006) (“Colonial Pennsylvania’s marriage law allowed the colony’s diverse
cultural groups to follow their own traditions.”).
53
C. LaRue Munson & William D. Crocker, The Divorce Question in the United States,
18 YALE L.J. 387, 388 (1909).
54
The law in Pennsylvania provided, as one of the punishments for adultery, that “both
he and the woman shall be liable to a Bill of Divorcement, if required by the grieved husband
or wife, within the said term of one year after Conviction.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 45.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See infra notes 323 and 324 and accompanying text.
58
See J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1095
(1992) (reviewing DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kays eds., 1990)) (“After the American Revolution, most states quickly accepted the
idea of absolute divorce . . . .”).
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States, with even the southern states coming on board.59 It is important to note,
however, that the practice of divorce at this time was a far cry from how it operates
today. To begin with, it was fault-based, meaning that to obtain a divorce, an
aggrieved spouse would have to “prove that the other spouse had violated the marital
contract in some severe way”60 and, at this point in history, those grounds were quite
limited.61 Perhaps the biggest difference, however, lies in the fact that, although a
state might permit divorce, the courts in that state often lacked jurisdiction to grant
them. Instead, in some states, it was the state legislature—similar to Parliament in
England—that was responsible for dissolving marriages.62
This practice, known as legislative divorce, required aggrieved spouses to
petition the legislature for “private bills granting a divorce to a single couple, who,
in the opinion of the legislators, deserved one.”63 Maryland, for instance, passed
over 500 divorce acts between the years 1790 and 1850.64 In some states, like
Virginia, only the legislature could grant an absolute divorce.65 In others, like
59

See RILEY, supra note 39, at 34–35 (“Southern legislatures, except in South Carolina,
made a radical change in their divorce policy after the American Revolution; although they
had opposed absolute divorce during the colonial period, they now began to allow it.”).
60
Ribner & Ribner, supra note 18, at 1245; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead
Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1501 (2000)
(“A divorce action was, in form, an adversary lawsuit. The plaintiff came before the court as
an innocent victim arguing that the defendant, husband or wife, had broken the marriage
contract. State statutes contained lists of bad deeds that constituted ‘grounds’ for divorce.”).
61
See Ribner & Ribner, supra note 18, at 1245 (explaining that grounds typically
involved “abuse, infidelity, or extreme cruelty”); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Faithless Wives
and Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 651, 665 (2002) (“At the beginning of the nineteenth century, even the most liberal of
divorce laws allowed divorce only on very limited fault grounds.”); see also JONES, supra
note 48, at 19–24 (delineating the various grounds for divorce in the states following the
American Revolution).
62
See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV.
L. REV. 302, 302 (1913) (“Legislative divorces were granted in New York after the
Revolution and were known in Connecticut, Maryland, and Rhode Island in the nineteenth
century.”); RILEY, supra note 39, at 35 (“After the Revolution, southern legislatures
replicated this [Parliamentary] practice by granting legislative divorces to southern men and
women.”).
63
Joanna L. Grossman, Separated Spouses, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1645 (2001)
(reviewing HENDRICK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000)).
64
RICHARD H. CHUSED, PRIVATE ACTS IN PUBLIC PLACES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
DIVORCE IN THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 1 (1994).
65
See Areen, supra note 37, at 82 (“In 1803, the Commonwealth of Virginia first began
to grant divorces, but only by legislative act.”). It is worth noting, however, that Virginia
began permitting its citizens divorce largely due to “[s]lavery and racism rather than religion
. . . .” Id. Indeed, the first two divorces granted in Virginia were to husbands whose wives
had given birth to biracial children, admitting that they had sexual relations with a slave. As
Areen explains, “[w]hatever the strength of the opposition to divorce in Anglican Virginia,
it was no match for the reaction of the legislature when confronted with a marriage that
involved not only adultery by a wife, but adultery with a slave.” Id. at 82–83.
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Georgia, the legislature authorized a “two-stage procedure”66 that involved both the
judiciary and the legislature.67 The reason for the legislatures’ reluctance to
completely divest themselves of this authority was the concern that some citizens
who might be “deserving” of a divorce would nonetheless be unable to satisfy the
limited statutory grounds for obtaining one.68 However, given that legislative
divorce “was a time-consuming process and one for which the ordinary legislative
committee was poorly equipped,”69 one by one, the states began to end the practice,
many by constitutional amendment.70 In most states, the practice ended prior to the
Civil War, typically following legislation that expanded the grounds for obtaining a
judicial divorce.71
Even with the eventual move to judicial divorce in all states, different
jurisdictions required different grounds for dissolving a marriage.72 Not surprisingly,
some states were more liberal than others,73 and some made it extremely difficult to
escape an unhappy marriage. South Carolina was the strictest, refusing to allow
divorce of any kind until 1949.74 Next was New York, which, from 1787 until 1968,
only permitted one ground for divorce: adultery.75 For couples living in those states,
it was only a matter of time before they realized there was another avenue available
to those who truly wished to terminate a marriage.

66

See PHILLIPS, supra note 34, at 144.
See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 52–53 (discussing how Georgia’s 1798 constitution
“permitted two-thirds of each branch of the legislature to pass acts of divorce, but specified
that this might be done only after the parties had had a fair trial before the superior court”).
68
Blake provides two such examples. First, he describes how “the Kentucky legislature
continued to pass private divorce bills, usually to accommodate individuals whose cases did
not come clearly under the regular statute.” Id. at 54. Missouri did likewise, motivated by
concerns “that the ordinary law did not provide for many cases of real hardship.” Id. at 56.
69
Id. at 55.
70
RILEY, supra note 39, at 36 (“Only gradually did constitutional provisions and
amendments bring a halt to legislative divorce.”).
71
See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 56–57 (“In most states the granting of legislative
divorce was halted sometime before the Civil War . . . [and] was hastened by more liberal
general statutes.”).
72
See Cahn, supra note 61, at 665 (“By the end of the [nineteenth] century, states had
experimented with various different, and more liberal, grounds for permitting divorce . . . .”).
73
Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and
Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1690 (2011) (“The Midwestern and Western
states tended to adopt more liberal standards.”).
74
Id.; James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 917 (2000)
(“With the exception of ten years during the Reconstruction Era, South Carolina courts
allowed no divorces until 1949.”).
75
See RILEY, supra note 39, at 46 (“New York was the only northeastern state to limit
divorce to the sole ground of adultery.”); J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to
Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 559, 579 (2007).
67
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B. The Rise of the “Divorce Mills”
Although Reno, Nevada, would eventually become known as the “Divorce
Capital of the Nation,”76 divorce mills (as they came to be called) actually started in
the east and, over time, existed in some form in over a dozen states.77 The states of
the northeast appear to have been the first to successfully tempt out-of-state residents
to temporarily relocate for the purpose of securing a divorce. Although most required
a full year of residence to establish domicile,78 it was well worth it to those who
resided in neighboring New York given that, prior to 1787, one could only obtain a
divorce by petitioning the legislature.79 As James Kent, writing in 1832, would
remark: “This strictness was productive of public inconvenience, and often forced
the parties . . . to some other state, to avail themselves of a more easy and certain
remedy.”80 Pennsylvania, in particular, seemed to be a popular destination, as
referenced in a New York legislative committee report from 1840: “Yet how many
unfortunate ‘yoke fellows’ annually seek a refuge from our inexorable law, and take
up a residence in moral Pennsylvania, for the sole purpose of dissolving a connection
which has been productive of nothing but bitter unhappiness.”81
Although New York would eventually begin allowing judicial divorce, courts
there could only bestow one upon those spouses who could prove that the other had
committed adultery.82 Thus, New York marriages that were free of adultery could
only be dissolved through one of two means, either manufacturing “adultery” or
relocating to a state with more favorable divorce laws. The first option, as Joanne
Grossman and Lawrence Friedman describe, was quite popular:
New York developed what has been called soft-core adultery. The husband
would check in to a hotel. A woman (for some reason, she was usually a
blonde) would come to his room. They would take off some of their
76

See JACK HARPSTER, THE GENESIS OF RENO: THE HISTORY OF THE RIVERSIDE HOTEL
AND THE VIRGINIA STREET BRIDGE 69 (2016).
77
See JONES supra note 48, at 25 (showing a map of the various “divorce havens” over
time, specifically Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming).
78
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 117 (“This was a more patient generation than ours, and
divorce seekers did not expect to win their freedom in a mere six weeks. At least a year’s
residence was required in all eastern states, and in otherwise liberal Connecticut three years
were specified.”).
79
J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has
Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 564 (2007) (noting how in New York in 1787,
“the power to grant such relief resided in the legislature with no provision for a trial on the
facts”).
80
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 68 (9th ed. 1858).
81
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 117.
82
See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN
SOCIETY 443–44 (1988) (noting that, in 1787, New York passed a law that “specified
adultery as the sole ground for divorce,” and that law “remained substantially unchanged for
almost two centuries”).
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clothes (usually not all) . . . . [T]here would be a knock on the door—a
maid with towels, or a bellboy with a telegram. Then a photographer
would burst in and take pictures. The woman would then collect her fee
($50 was normal), and disappear. The photos would show up in court, as
evidence of adultery.83
For the more affluent,84 however, the option of migratory divorce provided
another pathway to divorce—one that did not require the spouses to engage in
collusive perjury.
In mid-nineteenth-century America, Ohio85 and Illinois86 became popular
divorce destinations, but it was the unique attributes of Indiana’s laws that made it
especially attractive to those seeking a quick divorce.87 As Nelson Blake has
described, the law there included “two unusual features.”88 The first was an
“omnibus clause” that permitted Indiana courts to grant a divorce not only for the
enumerated grounds, but for “any other cause, and in any other case, where the court,
in their discretion, shall consider it reasonable and proper that a divorce should be
granted.”89 The second was the state’s “almost non-existent residency
requirement,”90 which required only that the plaintiff be a “bona fide resident of the
county,” for which the plaintiff’s “own affidavit was accepted as prima facie
evidence.”91 An 1860 editorial in the Indiana Daily Journal bemoaned the fact that
the convergence of these two provisions “gave the whole Union a chance to be
divorced here and flooded our courts with the abomination of half the dishonored

83

GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 167–68 (citation omitted).
See Wylene Rholetter, New York, in CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 880, 880 (Robert E. Emery ed., 2013) (“Migratory divorce was the choice
of the wealthy.”); Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform
Proposals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 613 n.21
(1999) (“[M]igratory divorces were common only among the wealthy who could afford an
extended trip to a jurisdiction that granted quick divorces.”).
85
See JONES, supra note 48, at 23 (“Ohio’s liberalism lay in having a substantial number
of grounds (10), several of which lent themselves to a broad interpretation.”).
86
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 118 (“After the Civil War Chicago gained renown as a
divorce Mecca.”).
87
What all three had in common, however, was their proximity to the east. As one
historian describes, “the impetus for change had passed from the northeastern U.S. to what
has become known as the Old Northwest (Ohio, Indiana and Illinois).” JONES, supra note
48, at 22.
88
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 119.
89
Michael Grossberg & Amy Elson, Family Law in Indiana: A Domestic Relations
Crossroads, in THE HISTORY OF INDIANA LAW 60, 64 (David J. Bodenhamer & Randall T.
Shepard eds., 2006).
90
Jennifer Ann Drobac, Jazzing Up Family Law: The First Annual Midwest Family
Law Conference, 42 IND. L. REV. 533, 542 (2009).
91
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 119.
84
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homes on the continent.”92 Indeed, from 1867 to 1871, Indiana was the first in the
nation in granting divorces to those who were married in other states.93 Although
many in Indiana were delighted—chief among them divorce attorneys and
boardinghouse operators94—others in the state became concerned with this growing
notoriety and eventually succeeded in 1859 in lobbying the legislature to enact a
one-year residency requirement95 that was subsequently increased to two years in
1873.96 By 1881, Indiana had fallen from first all the way to seventh in the rankings
of divorce-granting states.97
With Indiana out of the running, the race was on for the next state to dominate
the business of migratory divorce. Between the 1870s and 1880s, Iowa, Rhode
Island, and the District of Columbia all98 had some degree of success in attracting
“the pseudo-tourists of the divorce trade,”99 but, as Blake put it, “the path of
divorce—like that of the empire—seemed destined to move westward.”100 And
much of that movement had to do with mining, or more specifically, the short
residency requirements that many of the western territories had established to cater
to the large number of miners who were relocating there.101 Of course, these laws
had nothing to do with marriage or divorce but were instead “[o]riginally intended
to hasten the ability of transient miners and other new arrivals to vote in territorial
and, later, state elections.”102
Divorce seekers soon learned, however, that a short residency requirement,
coupled with laws providing more liberal grounds for divorce, offered an avenue for
92

See Val Nolan, Jr., Indiana: Birthplace of Migratory Divorce, 26 IND. L.J. 515, 520
n.22 (1951).
93
Id. at 526. In fact, during that period, Indiana was responsible for granting
approximately ten percent of the divorces in the nation, averaging between 1096 and 1210
per year. Id.
94
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 120 (“Indiana lawyers and boardinghouse keepers were
happy to accommodate the migrants.”); Drobac, supra note 90, at 542 (“While this divorce
industry might have been good for Indiana businesses and services, especially those provided
by Indiana lawyers, sister states such as New York, with no such legal escapes, decried the
practice.”).
95
See RILEY, supra note 39, at 65 (noting that “[p]roof of residency beyond the
petitioner’s affidavit was also required”).
96
See Drobac, supra note 90, at 543 n.84 (“[T]he residency requirement increased to
one year in 1859 and two years in 1873.”). Apparently, even after the enactment of the oneyear residency requirement, Indiana “remained sufficiently inviting to bring many divorce
seekers to the state.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 120.
97
Nolan, supra note 92, at 526 (“Indiana fell from first in the nation between 1867
through 1871 to fourth during the next five year period, and seventh in the next.”).
98
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 121.
99
BARBER, supra note 10, at 90.
100
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 121.
101
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
102
BARBER, supra note 10, at 54; see also RILEY, supra note 39, at 135 (noting that the
Nevada residency law was “intended to accommodate the needs of a highly mobile
population of miners and entrepreneurs”).
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those living out of state to obtain a relatively quick divorce. For that reason, both the
Utah Territory and the Dakota Territory emerged as popular destinations for those
seeking divorces.103 In Utah, the divorce statute required only that the plaintiff be “a
resident of the Territory, or wishes to become one,”104 while the Dakota Territory
enacted a mere three-month residency requirement—one that was subsequently
retained by the resulting states of North and South Dakota.105 In both Utah and the
Dakotas, however, negative publicity eventually led to the passage of stricter laws—
laws that effectively ended the migratory divorce trade in those states.106 Another
western territory, however, would prove steadfast in maintaining its favorable
divorce laws and, as time wore on, would make it increasingly easier for those
traveling from out of state to obtain a divorce. Indeed, when it came to migratory
divorce, “the winner, in the long run, was Nevada.”107
Nevada’s success stemmed from an 1861 law that the then-territory passed
regarding residency. Once again, motivated by the large number of miners flooding
into the state, the law only required six months of continuous residence.108 Miners
soon learned, however, that the law (which Nevada retained when it became a state
in 1864) also made it easier for them to obtain a divorce. And this ability was quite
attractive to them given that, as one commentator describes, “[m]iners who came to
find fortunes in the Comstock often found new lives and new loves. If they were
going to establish new families—legally—they had to be sure of legal separation
from former mates.”109 Nevada safeguarded that ability by maintaining its short
residency requirement but also by adopting relatively liberal grounds for divorce.
As historian Alicia Barber explains:
New York, for instance, provided only one ground for divorce, adultery.
[In contrast,] Nevada had retained seven grounds for divorce: desertion,
cruelty, nonsupport, drunkenness, impotency, imprisonment, and adultery.
To make matters even easier, many of these grounds, like “cruelty” were
quite open to interpretation; in addition, no evidence was required to prove
103

BLAKE, supra note 11, at 122–23.
Id. at 122. In addition to its enumerated grounds, Utah maintained an omnibus
clause, stating that a judge could grant a divorce “when it shall be made to appear to the
satisfaction and conviction of the court that the parties cannot live in peace and union
together and that their welfare requires a separation.” RILEY, supra note 39, at 96 (quoting
Utah Territorial Laws 82–84 (1852)).
105
See JONES, supra note 48, at 33 (“The Dakotas had the most lenient residence
requirements in the period 1879–1899.”).
106
See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 122–23 (describing how “the territorial legislature [of
Utah] eventually slammed the door by enacting a one-year residence requirement and
abolishing the omnibus clause”); see also RILEY, supra note 39, at 100–01 (discussing how
South Dakota increased its residence requirement to one year in 1909 and North Dakota did
the same in 1899).
107
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 169.
108
See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
109
BARBARA LAND & MYRICK LAND, A SHORT HISTORY OF RENO 47 (1995).
104
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any of these charges, [thus allowing] unhappy spouses to pursue divorce
without stating much of a reason at all.110
For a time, these peculiarities of Nevada law would remain somewhat unknown
to those outside the state. Near the turn of the twentieth century, however, something
“unexpected”111 happened—an event that would catapult Reno, Nevada, into the
consciousness of the nation and lead to its ultimate reputation as the “refuge of
restless hearts.”112
The event in question was the arrival of Laura Corey, who came to Reno in
1905 by “private railroad car of steel magnate Charles Schwab”113 with “a retinue of
maids and servants.”114 Corey was the wife of U.S. Steel President William E. Corey,
and the two had been married for twenty-two years.115 Mrs. Corey, however, did not
behave like the typical tourist. For instance, she did not check into a local hotel but
instead signed a six-month lease for a furnished home “at a very high rent.”116 A
great deal of publicity attended her arrival, with reporters repeatedly asking whether
there was any truth to the rumors that she was there to get a divorce so that her
husband could marry actress Mabel Gilman.117 Corey adamantly denied these
rumors: “There is no truth in that foolish story . . . . To even think that my husband
is infatuated with an actress is ridiculous. I am not in Nevada to get a divorce, but
came with my sister-in-law and her friend for the benefit of the latter’s health.”118
Nonetheless, once she had been in Reno for the requisite six months, Corey
immediately filed for and received a divorce on the grounds of desertion.119 She soon
left Reno for Pennsylvania, and her ex-husband did indeed marry Ms. Gilman the
following year.120 The whole affair was quite the scandal, but because the public
came to see Mrs. Corey as the wronged party, “Nevada’s prompt and easy surgery
won wide applause.”121
110

BARBER, supra note 10, at 54; see also Katherine L. Caldwell, Not Ozzie and
Harriet: Postwar Divorce and the American Liberal Welfare State, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1,
39–40 (1998) (describing Nevada as a divorce mill that “offer[ed] ‘quickie’ divorces on
grounds such as ‘mental cruelty’ very liberally defined”).
111
See BARBER, supra note 10, at 53.
112
Id. at 58.
113
Id. at 53.
114
HARPSTER, supra note 76, at 86.
115
LAND & LAND, supra note 109, at 48 (noting that “the steel tycoon had a wondering
eye”).
116
BARBER, supra note 10, at 53.
117
Id. at 54; see also DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIENCE 71 (2010) (noting that William Corey had “unceremoniously deserted his wife
and family for the attractive musical-comedy singer, Mabelle Gilman”).
118
See BARBER, supra note 10, at 54 (quoting Expects a Divorce, ALTOONA MIRROR,
(Dec. 7, 1905)).
119
Id. at 55.
120
Id.
121
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 153; see also BOORSTIN, supra note 117, at 71 (“The press
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In July 1906, the New York Times reported Corey’s divorce decree on its front
page, but publicity of this sort was only the beginning. As one historian described it,
“Laura Corey may have left Reno, but the national spotlight did not.”122 Soon,
countless people across the country began following Mrs. Corey’s lead and traveled
to Reno in order to obtain their own speedy divorce123—or to get “Reno-vated” as
some began to call it.124 Such pilgrimages were made easier by enterprising attorneys
who, sensing a business opportunity, moved to Reno and began advertising their
divorce services in publications nationwide. For instance, in 1907, attorney William
Schnitzer moved from New York City to Reno and promptly opened a practice
specializing in divorce.125 He soon published a pamphlet titled “Marriage and
Divorce,” which he distributed to “more than 2000 lawyers in New York and
Canada.”126 Such efforts paid off, and more and more people began traveling to Reno
to secure a divorce. Before long, stories of unhappy spouses who traveled to Reno
for purposes of securing a divorce made their way into a number of popular
movies,127 books,128 plays,129 and even music130 from that time period. As a result,
phrases like “‘going to Reno’ and the ‘Reno cure’ quickly became nationally
recognized euphemisms for seeking a divorce.”131
Not all Nevadans welcomed this newfound publicity, and some took to heart
the public censure that critics began hurling at the state. In 1911, for instance, an
editorial in the New York Times declared that “[t]he divorce mill itself is a scandal.
fumed with righteous indignation against [William], but praised the laws of Nevada as the
shield of the injured innocent.”).
122
BARBER, supra note 10, at 56; see also RILEY, supra note 39, at 136 (“The resulting
publicity catapulted Reno into the national spotlight.”).
123
See RILEY, supra note 39, at 136 (noting how the Corey divorce brought “the ease
of Reno divorce, at least for those who could afford to travel to Nevada and spend six months
there” to the public’s attention); BLAKE, supra note 11, at 153 (noting how, after the Corey
divorce, “more and more outsiders began to come to Nevada for divorces”).
124
See GUY CLIFTON, IMAGES OF AMERICA: RENO 7 (2012) (describing how “thousands
of people from throughout the United States [made] their way to town to get ‘The Cure’ or
become ‘Reno-vated,’ as the Eastern papers called it”).
125
See RILEY, supra note 39, at 136.
126
BARBER, supra note 10, at 56. As one historian notes, however, “[w]hen the Reno
Bar Association objected to Schnitzer’s advertising as unethical, the Nevada Supreme Court
in 1911 suspended his license to practice for eight months.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 154.
127
See, e.g., A RENO DIVORCE (Warner Bros. 1927), THE ROAD TO RENO (Paramount
Pictures 1931), MERRY WIVES OF RENO (Warner Bros. 1934), MAISIE GOES TO RENO (MGM
1944), THE MISFITS (Seven Arts Productions 1961).
128
See, e.g., EDITH WHARTON, THE CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY (1913); FAITH
BALDWIN, TEMPORARY ADDRESS: RENO (1941).
129
See, e.g., CLARE BOOTH LUCE, THE WOMEN (1936); WINCHELL SMITH & FRANK
BACON, LIGHTNIN’ (1918).
130
See, e.g., WILLIAM JEROME & JEAN SCHWARTZ, I’M ON MY WAY TO RENO (1910).
131
Friedman, supra note 60, at 1505 (“‘Going to Reno’ became almost a synonym for
getting a divorce.”); see also BARBER, supra note 10, at 57 (“For better or for worse, Reno
was now literally a household name.”).
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Reno has made itself a reproach and a shame.”132 When former president Theodore
Roosevelt visited the state in 1911, he reportedly declared “that no city or State could
long exist by harboring divorce and building up a colony of married people who
sought to be rid of their mates.”133 Nevadans would soon join these calls for change,
and in 1913 the state’s leading newspaper at the time published an editorial, warning
readers that “[t]his state and this city cannot advance permanently unless they be
fortified not only in self-respect, but in the respect of all who think of us. Any work
too damaging for any other state to do is certainly too damaging for Nevada to do.”134
Eventually, on February 7, 1913, this dissatisfaction came to a head, and 160
angry Nevadans marched on the state capital demanding change.135 As one historian,
writing in 1962, describes:
[T]he militant visitors marched straight to the capitol building where they
crowded into the assembly chamber, overflowing the gallery and standing
in every available space on the floor of the house itself. The clergyman
who made the opening prayer called God’s attention to the fact that the
eyes of the commonwealth and the nation were upon Nevada and asked
“that strength be given that the state be freed from the curses which beset
her.”136
The reformers’ efforts worked. The Nevada legislature voted to amend the law
and institute a one-year residency requirement for those whose spouses resided
outside of the state.137
With that change in the law, however, came the realization of just how much
the state economy had benefitted from migratory divorce. After all, each Reno
divorce typically brought with it a number of temporary residents: “a plaintiff; a
defendant, unless the divorce was uncontested; other family members; witnesses;
often friends and supporters; and in the case of wealthy divorce-seekers, maids and
servants.”138 Further, each of these people would have needed to remain in the state
for six months, resulting in considerable revenue for a number of Nevadans. As one
historian describes it: “Lawyers and lodging operators profited most directly, but the
ripple effect spread to clothing stores, restaurants, salons, pharmacies, and other
businesses that provided services to them as well as the permanent population.”139
132

Sensitive Reno, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1911, at 10.
Roosevelt Assails Reno, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1911, at 1.
134
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 155.
135
See RILEY, supra note 39, at 136.
136
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 155.
137
See BARBER, supra note 10, at 88 (noting that the residency requirement was
extended “to twelve months for parties with only one spouse residing in Nevada”); BLAKE,
supra note 11, at 155 (describing how, in light of the reformers’ demonstration, “the
prodivorce majority melted away, and the one-year residence bill was expedited toward final
passage”).
138
HARPSTER, supra note 76, at 136.
139
BARBER, supra note 10, at 85.
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By raising the residency period to a full year, however, Nevada had lost much of its
appeal as a divorce destination, thus eroding the ample revenue from which so many
Nevadans had come to depend.140 Many Nevadans were none too pleased with this
prospect of reduced income141—a sentiment reflected in the words of a Nevada poet
writing in the early 1900s:
Have you ever thought about the Reno Colony,
And what we owe this little fad, divorce?
Fair plaintiffs oft advising,
Forever criticising,
Yet their money helps us on a bit, of course.
If you legislate against the Reno colony,
To other fields the fair ones you will drive.
For ill-advised propriety
Brings poverty with piety,
And some of us would prefer to thrive.142
As such resentments grew, Nevadans would once again demand a change in the
law, this time using the ballot box.
In 1914—the very same year that the new residency requirement took effect—
Nevadans successfully voted out of office a number of state politicians seen as
responsible for the change in the law. Included in that group was the governor,
Tasker Oddie, who had signed the one-year residency requirement into law, as well
as a number of state legislators who had voted in favor of it.143 The following year,
their replacements succeeded in reinstating the six-month residency provision.144 In
so doing, the new governor, Emmet D. Boyle, said that any future changes should
come from the people, by way of popular referendum: “Moral and social questions
on which the people are divided, should, if possible, be kept out of the legislature
where they tend to obscure legislation of even greater moment to the serious
140

See RILEY, supra note 39, at 136 (“[B]usiness people and entrepreneurs created a
public outcry against the measure. They sorely missed the revenues, including transportation
costs, legal fees, entertainment, meals, and lodging that the divorce trade put into their
pockets.”).
141
See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 155–56 (“The reformers’ victory was bitterly resented
by the lawyers, hotelkeepers, and merchants who had profited from the divorce colony.”);
BOORSTIN, supra note 117, at 71 (pointing out that “lawyers, merchants, bartenders,
hotelkeepers, and others quickly registered their protest”).
142
LESLIE CURTIS, RENO REVERIES 60 (1912).
143
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 156; see also HARPSTER, supra note 76, at 111 (“Governor
Tasker Oddie signed the measure, but he and many of the legislators paid the price when
they were defeated at the polls the following year.”).
144
See BARBER, supra note 10, at 89 (describing how those in favor of reinstating the
earlier law succeeded “with the help of many new faces in the legislature, as well as a new
governor”).

314

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

detriment of good government.”145 Citizens attempted to do just that in 1922 when
they placed a proposition on the ballot to again raise the residency requirement to
one year.146 The proposal lost by a vote of three to one.147
Going forward, Nevada not only embraced its status as a divorce haven but also
actively attempted to ward off any competitors who sought to siphon off portions of
that industry.148 In 1927, as countries like Mexico and France began to horn in on
the migratory divorce trade, Nevada reduced its residency requirement even further
to just three months.149 When it then became evident that Idaho and Arkansas
intended to likewise lower their residency requirements to three months, Nevada
doubled down and, in 1931, lowered it again to a mere six weeks.150 In response,
one of the headlines from that time read “Revival of Gold Rush Days Predicted. Beat
This One, If You Can.”151 It was no coincidence that, in the very same year, Nevada
also legalized gambling, which meant that those who traveled to the state to obtain
a divorce now had even more ways to spend their money as they whiled away the
required six weeks.152 And, to maximize the time these Reno divorce seekers would
have to spend in the state, the 1931 divorce law “required a sworn witness to testify
that the divorce-seeker had been sighted in the state each and every day for six
weeks.”153 Statistics from that year reveal that Nevada had the highest divorce rate
in the country—four times the national average, in fact.154 It was further estimated
145

BLAKE, supra note 11, at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.; RILEY, supra note 39, at 137.
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BLAKE, supra note 11, at 156; RILEY, supra note 39, at 137.
148
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“[a]lways under pressure from other divorce mill states, especially Idaho and Arkansas”).
149
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150
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 156–57; BOORSTIN, supra note 117, at 71; see also
BARBER, supra note 10, at 118 (noting that “Reno’s hold on the lucrative divorce industry . . .
seemed even more precarious once Idaho and Arkansas each” adopted three-month residency
provisions); PHILLIPS, supra note 34, at 196 (describing the “veritable divorce trade war
[that] broke out among states such as Nevada, Idaho, and Arkansas”).
151
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 157.
152
I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law®: The Third Wave of Legal Gambling, 17
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 361, 374 (2010) (“The Great Depression gave birth to the third
wave of legal gambling. Nevada re-legalized casino gambling in 1931.”); see also BARBER,
supra note 10, at 119 (noting that, when it came to reducing the residency requirement and
legalizing gambling, “the two bills were in many ways intertwined”); RILEY, supra note 39,
at 137 (“[L]iberal gambling provisions guaranteed that divorce-seekers would be able to
amuse themselves—and spend more money—while they waited for their residencies to
become final.”).
153
BARBER, supra note 10, at 135.
154
Id. at 129; see also RILEY, supra note 39, at 137 (noting that, from 1930 to 1931,
Nevada went from granting 2,609 divorces per year to 5,260).
146
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that the divorce trade brought between $1 million and $5 million per year to the
state.155 As one commentator from that period remarked, “[s]ince divorce is a
$4,000,000-a-year industry for Reno, you might as well move all orange trees out of
Florida as take the divorce business from Nevada.”156
Of course, with revenues that large, it was no surprise that other states would
take notice. As one scholar writing in 1935 put it: “Other states came to envy the
monopolization by Nevada of such a lucrative business, and competition unsheathed
its sharpened claws.”157 In addition to Idaho and Arkansas, mentioned earlier,158
states like Wyoming, Florida, and Alabama were also eager to obtain their share of
the migratory divorce business. In 1935, for instance, the Wyoming legislature
reduced the state’s residency requirement from one year to sixty days.159 That same
year, Florida reduced its one-year residency requirement to three months.160 The
Florida representative who introduced the law had this to say in support of the
measure: “If they are going to get divorces, . . . we can’t stop them and we might as
well invite them to Florida to spend the money.”161 And indeed, Florida did enjoy
considerable success as a divorce haven. As Blake describes: “In 1946, at the peak
of the postwar rise in divorce, Florida granted over 26,000 divorces. The rate per
thousand population was 12.1, second only to that in Nevada.”162 That success,
however, would end in 1957 when the governor persuaded state lawmakers to raise
the residency requirement to six months.163
Ultimately, the most successful challenger was Alabama, which for a period of
time even eclipsed the popularity of Nevada as a divorce destination. It all started in
1945 when Alabama amended its law to provide that the state’s one-year residency
requirement did not apply “when the court has jurisdiction of both parties to the

155

RUSSELL R. ELLIOT, HISTORY OF NEVADA 285 (2d ed. 1987); see also HARPSTER,
supra note 76, at 125 (“It has been estimated that the divorce business in Reno accounted for
more than $5 million annually at the time (equivalent to $66 million today).”).
156
SHEPHERD, supra note 32, at 50.
157
Frank W. Ingram & G. A. Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada, 2
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 302, 306 (1935).
158
See supra note 148–150 and accompanying text.
159
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 167 (noting nonetheless that Wyoming’s tourist business
was likely “modest”).
160
Id.
161
Id.; see also C. Jonathan Hauck, Jr., Birds of Passage, 28 GEO. L. J. 809, 811 n.12
(1940) (describing how, when the representative was asked if this measure was intended to
put Florida into competition with Nevada, he replied: “It is in competition to all the United
States; it is to get people to come to Florida”).
162
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 168; JONES, supra note 48, at 110 (noting that among the
states attempting to compete for the migratory divorce business at that time, “only Florida
had the tourist attractions and easy accessibility to compete with Nevada”).
163
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 168–69 (noting that, in response to amending the law, the
governor “praised the legislature for taking action that would ‘enhance the prestige of our
state everywhere’”).
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cause of action.”164 Thus, in the absence of any specific period of residence, “if either
party was a bona fide resident of the state, the Alabama courts would assume
jurisdiction to grant divorce either for or against him, provided the other party
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by making a general appearance.”165 And
apparently, there was no shortage of Alabama attorneys willing to misrepresent the
residency status of those who had only just arrived in the state. As a story in TIME
magazine from 1962 described:
The fact is that for several years now, the easiest divorce terms in the
nation are to be found not in Nevada but in Alabama. A divorce seeker
need show up in Alabama only long enough to meet a lawyer, pay a fee,
fill out the papers and wait a few hours. The lawyer shoots off usually to
a rural county, hires a local lawyer to handle the court work, gets a decree
and hops back to his client.166
In the two decades following Alabama’s change to its residency requirement,
the state’s divorce rate rose by 400%.167 In 1960, for instance, Nevada granted 9,274
divorces while Alabama granted more than 17,000.168 Alabama’s numbers would
only start to drop when the state amended its rules of professional responsibility to
prohibit attorneys from assisting clients in misrepresenting their status as an
Alabama resident in order to obtain a quick divorce169—a law that would eventually
lead to the indictment and disbarment of several attorneys and even two judges.170
164
Migratory Divorce: The Alabama Experience, 75 HARV. L. REV. 568, 569–70
(1962); Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 74 (1948) (laying out the full text of the
amendment).
165
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 169.
166
Alabamy Unbound, TIME, Jan. 5, 1962, at 47.
167
See Wylene Rholetter, Alabama, in CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 56 (Robert E. Emery ed., 2013).
168
Kelly Kazek, When Alabama Flourished as Divorce Mill, Famous People Flocked
Here to Get Unhitched (Odd Travels), AL.COM (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.al.com/living
/2013/03/when_alabama_flourished_as_div.html [https://perma.cc/7WYD-ZH75].
169
See Migratory Divorce, supra note 164, at 569. The amended rule provided as
follows:

No person heretofore or hereafter admitted to practice law in Alabama shall . . .
while acting as attorney for either party in any suit for divorce in any court in
Alabama represent to the court or conspire with any party, attorney, or person to
represent to the court that either party to such suit is a bona fide resident of
Alabama, knowing such representation to be false.
Id.

170

See Kazek, supra note 168 (noting that “[i]n August of 1970, two Alabama circuit
court judges and seven others were indicted for taking part in a quickie divorce scam”); see
also Alabama Indictments Cast Doubt on Legality of ‘Quickie’ Divorces by Mail, N.Y. TIMES
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Nevada, on the other hand, would stay the course until the very end and even
to this day maintains a residency period of six weeks for purposes of receiving a
divorce.171 As the 1960s drew to a close, however, “one of the pillars of [the state’s]
tourist economy began to crumble.”172 That pillar, of course, was the migratory
divorce trade, its decline primarily attributable to the increasingly liberal divorce
laws that began sweeping the country.173 In 1968, for instance, New York amended
its divorce laws to allow for grounds other than adultery,174 and South Carolina
finally began to permit judicial divorce in the late 1940s.175 In addition, in 1970,
California would become the first state to enact no-fault divorce,176 whereby
“[i]nstead of holding a trial to determine whether a spouse was guilty of a serious
marital offense, no fault statutes allowed spouses to obtain divorces by mutual
consent or on grounds of incompatibility or ‘irretrievable breakdown’ of the
marriage.”177 By the mid-80s, most of the other states would likewise adopt some
form of no-fault divorce.178 Thus, “[f]rom being almost impossible without evidence
of fault or the agreement of one’s spouse,” divorce had become essentially unilateral

(Aug. 23, 1970), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1970/08/23/107201718.
html?pageNumber=53 [https://perma.cc/HCW9-P9WM] (highlighting that “those indicted
were three disbarred Birmingham lawyers . . . . ”); see also Rholetter, supra note 167, at 56
(“It was not until the early 1960s—when the Alabama Bar Association, in a self-policing
action, took a stand against the migratory divorces by disbarring some of its members
. . . .”).
171
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020(1)(e) (2021).
172
BARBER, supra note 10, at 180.
173
Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, Who Sues for Divorce? From Fault
Through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 67 (1976) (“But there were broader
pressures building up for reform—pressures more powerful than the greed of those who
profited from divorce mills.”).
174
See id. (listing the new grounds as “cruelty, abandonment, and two-years’
separation”); Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1977) (“With the enactment
of the Divorce Reform Law of 1966, New York abandoned its position as the only State in
the union which regarded adultery as the sole ground for absolute divorce.”) (internal
citations omitted).
175
See James W. Ely, Jr. & David J. Bodenhamer, Regionalism and American Legal
History: The Southern Experience, 39 VAND. L. REV. 539, 564 n.129 (1986); see generally
J.D. Sumner, Jr., The South Carolina Divorce Act of 1949, 3 S.C. L.Q. 253, 257–59 (1951).
176
Friedman & Percival, supra note 173, at 67 (noting that, in doing so, California
“abolished divorce as it had been classically constituted. In its place came ‘dissolution’ of
marriage—available when ‘irreconcilable differences’ cause the ‘irremediable breakdown’
of a marriage”).
177
Mintz, infra note 339, at 655.
178
Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective,
63 OR. L. REV. 649, 664 (1984) (“California was a pioneer state, but no-fault is now the rule
almost everywhere.”); see also Lauren Guidice, New York and Divorce: Finding Fault in a
No Fault System, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 787, 796 (2011) (“By the mid-1980s, all states had some
form of a no-fault provision integrated into their divorce law.”).
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throughout the United States.179 And, with that legal development, migratory divorce
“retreated into insignificance,” relegated to “little more than a subject for historical
study.”180
III. LEGAL REACTIONS
For migratory divorce to work as intended, states had to be willing to recognize
out-of-state divorces secured by their citizens during a temporary stay in the degreegranting state. And indeed, many states were willing to do just that out of comity.181
Some states, however, refused. They balked at the idea that one of its resident
citizens could have his or her marriage dissolved by a sister state simply because
that person’s spouse spent a certain amount of time in the sister state. Thus, the
question arose as to when a state was required to recognize a foreign divorce. And
given the inability of those opposed to migratory divorce to otherwise curb the
practice through a constitutional amendment182 or uniform legislation,183 “the burden
of prescribing such policies and criteria [was] shouldered”184 by the Supreme Court.
Indeed, over a period spanning more than seventy years, the Court would issue
twelve opinions on the subject—opinions that represented the Court’s evolving
views on the issue and which would ultimately affect tremendous change in the law
of domestic relations.185
A. The Supreme Court: Comity Versus Full Faith and Credit
The Supreme Court’s first exposure to migratory divorce came in 1858 with the
case of Barber v. Barber.186 There, Hiram Barber and Huldah Adeline Barber were
married in New York.187 Huldah eventually received a legal separation that required
Hiram to pay alimony, but in an attempt to avoid paying, Hiram “plac[ed] himself
179

ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG 18 (1992).
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§13:2, at 724 (2d ed. 1987).
181
See Cavers, supra note 29, at 103. As defined by the Supreme Court:
180

“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895).
182
See infra Section III.A.
183
See infra Section III.B.
184
Sumner, supra note 3, at 1.
185
See infra Part IV.
186
62 U.S. 582 (1858).
187
Id. at 584.
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beyond the jurisdiction of the court which could enforce it” by moving to Wisconsin
and divorcing Huldah.188 The case presented only the discrete question of whether
Huldah could file suit in Wisconsin to enforce the New York order, and the Court
agreed that she could.189 Thus, Barber did not provide an opportunity to answer the
larger question that migratory divorce would soon bring to the forefront of the
evolving law of domestic relations in the United States—namely, whether and to
what extent one state, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution,190 is required to recognize a divorce obtained in a sister state.
The Court would first weigh in on that question in 1869 when it decided
Cheever v. Wilson.191 In that case, Mrs. Cheever traveled to Indiana (a popular
divorce destination of the time),192 where she filed for divorce.193 Mr. Cheever not
only participated in the Indiana proceeding but consented to the dissolution.194
Divorce in hand, Mrs. Cheever left Indiana, but a property dispute in Washington
D.C. subsequently arose between her and a third party—one that implicated the
Indiana divorce settlement.195 The lower court ruled that the foreign divorce decree
was void, but the Supreme Court reversed, invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and holding that “[t]he Constitution and laws of the United States give the decree
the same effect elsewhere which it had in Indiana.”196 In response to the argument
that Mrs. Cheever did not actually reside in Indiana at the time of the divorce, the
Court was satisfied by the fact that the divorce decree “expressly found” that she
was a resident, and no party had produced evidence to suggest otherwise.197
The Court’s job in Cheever was made somewhat easier by the fact that Mr.
Cheever had participated in the Indiana divorce. In 1888, however, the Supreme
Court would rely on principles it first identified in Pennoyer v. Neff198 to hold that a
court can grant a divorce even in the absence of jurisdiction over the non-resident

188

Id. at 588.
Id. at 584 (“The record raises these inquiries: Whether a wife . . . can acquire another
domiciliation in a State of this Union different from that of her husband, to entitle her, by her
next friend, to sue him in a court of the United States having equity jurisdiction, to recover
from him alimony due . . . .”).
190
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof.”).
191
76 U.S. 108 (1869).
192
See supra notes 85–97 and accompanying text.
193
Cheever, 76 U.S. at 109.
194
Id. at 110 (noting that Mr. Cheever filed “a cross-bill, setting forth . . . that he had
abandoned her with intent never to live with her again; that reconciliation was impossible:
and he, too, on his part concluded his petition with a prayer for” divorce).
195
Id. at 111–12.
196
Id. at 123.
197
Id. (“The finding is clearly sufficient until overcome by adverse testimony. None
adequate to that result is found in the record.”).
198
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
189
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spouse.199 The case was Maynard v. Hill, 200 and it involved a husband who obtained
a legislative divorce in Oregon. The wife was not a resident of Oregon and claimed
that she never received notice of the pending action.201 The Court described the issue
as follows: “If the Assembly possessed the power to grant a divorce in any case, its
jurisdiction to legislate upon his status, he being a resident of the territory is
undoubted, unless the marriage was a contract within the prohibition of the federal
Constitution against its impairment by legislation . . . . ”202 The Court ruled that
marriage is, indeed, a status or an institution and not a contract: “though formed by
contract, it signifies the relation of husband and wife, deriving both its rights and
duties from a source higher than any contract of which the parties are capable, and
as to these uncontrollable by any contract which they can make.”203 In essence, the
Court recognized divorce as an in rem action and upheld the validity of the Oregon
divorce, although largely focusing on the right of a legislature to issue a divorce and
essentially ignoring the wife’s claim that she never received notice.204
In 1901, the Court would again take up the subject of migratory divorce, issuing
three opinions on the subject. In two of them, the Court held that a state was not
required to recognize a migratory divorce when the party who procured it did not
establish domicile in the divorce-granting state. For instance, in Bell v. Bell, the
husband obtained a Pennsylvania divorce by representing that he had resided in the
state for the required one-year period.205 Just ten weeks prior to that representation,
however, he had represented himself as a resident of New York in a separate action
there to probate a will.206 For that reason, the Court held that “the court in
Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction of the husband’s suit for divorce, because neither
party had a domicil in Pennsylvania, and the decree of divorce was entitled to no
faith and credit in New York or in any other state.”207 Similarly, in Streitwolf v.
199
See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 386 (2007) (noting the Court’s reliance on Pennoyer when
deciding Maynard v. Hill).
200
125 U.S. 190 (1888).
201
Id. at 193.
202
Id. at 209.
203
Id. at 212 (emphasis omitted). The Court added that, “[w]hen formed, this relation
is no more a contract than ‘fatherhood’ or ‘sonship’ is a contract.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
204
See Mark Strasser, Divorce, Domicile, and the Constitution, 108 KY. L.J. 301, 304–
05 (2019) (“[T]he Court simply did not address whether Lydia’s allegation that she had not
received actual or constructive notice of the divorce, if true, was a basis upon which the
divorce should be nullified. Instead, the Court focused on whether a legislature rather than a
judge could issue a divorce . . . .”); see also Sumner, supra note 3, at 4 (“In this country a
divorce suit has always been regarded as in the nature of an in rem proceeding. Consequently,
it is held that judicial jurisdiction over the defendant spouse is not necessary, as it is in the
ordinary adversary proceeding.”).
205
181 U.S. 175 (1901).
206
Id. at 177 (noting that, in that action, he described himself “as residing at Buffalo,
in the county of Erie and state of New York”).
207
Id. at 178.
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Streitwolf, the husband obtained a divorce in North Dakota after representing
himself as having resided there for ninety days when, in fact, he had only spent a
few weeks in the state, spending the remainder of that time either back home in New
York or traveling through Yellowstone National Park.208
In the third case, however, the Court ruled that the state of New York was
required to recognize a Kentucky divorce. The case was Atherton v. Atherton, and
although it technically did not involve migratory divorce, the Court’s rationale
would prove instrumental in subsequent cases dealing with migratory divorce.209
There, the couple had married in New York but ultimately resided in Kentucky until
such time as the wife, claiming that the husband was abusive, returned to New
York.210 He subsequently obtained a Kentucky divorce on the grounds of
abandonment.211 In ruling that the judgment was binding on New York, the Court
introduced the concept of “matrimonial domicile.”212 Specifically, the Court held
that because Kentucky was the state in which the couple had last resided as a married
couple, and the husband had continued to reside there after the wife returned to New
York, the divorce was entitled to full faith and credit.213
In 1903, however, the Court went further and issued a more controversial
opinion, holding that a state need not recognize a foreign divorce even when the
spouse who procured it had satisfied the residency requirement of the divorcegranting state. In Andrews v. Andrews, Charles and Kate Andrews were married and
subsequently resided in Massachusetts.214 Four years later, Charles desired a divorce
and thus traveled to South Dakota, where he seemingly resided long enough to
establish residency.215 He then returned to Massachusetts, where he remarried.216
When he died, both wives came forward claiming to be his widow.217 The second
wife pointed to the foreign divorce as evidence that his first marriage legally
terminated, but the Massachusetts court refused to recognize the divorce on the basis
of state law, which provided that a divorce is invalid “if an inhabitant of this
Commonwealth goes into another State or country to obtain a divorce for a cause
which occurred here, while the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not
authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth.”218 Finding that Charles’s
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181 U.S. 179, 182 (1901).
181 U.S. 155 (1901).
210
Id. at 155–56.
211
Id. at 157–58.
212
Id. at 171.
213
Id. at 162 (“There can be no doubt that this decree was by law and usage entitled to
full faith and credit as an absolute decree of divorce in the state of Kentucky.”).
214
188 U.S. 14 (1903).
215
Id. at 16 (noting that “he remained personally in that state a period of time longer
than is necessary by the laws of said state to gain a domicil there . . . .”).
216
Id. at 17.
217
Id. at 15.
218
Id. at 29.
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time in South Dakota was insufficient to have established a “bona fide domicil,”219
the Supreme Court agreed that Massachusetts could constitutionally refuse to
recognize the South Dakota divorce.220
Together, these cases stand for the proposition that a state is not bound by a
foreign divorce issued in a state where the party requesting that divorce was not
domiciled at the time, even if the party had established residency in that state. In
1906, however, the Court would take what Justice Brown described as “a step
backward in American jurisprudence,”221 and hold that even in the face of a foreign
domicile, a state need not recognize a divorce from a sister state. The case was
Haddock v. Haddock, and it involved a couple that was married in New York.222
Shortly after the marriage, the husband alone relocated to Connecticut, where he
obtained a divorce.223 It was undisputed, however, that Connecticut did not have
jurisdiction over Mrs. Haddock, given that “the pendency of the petition was by
publication and she had not appeared in the action.”224 The Court began the opinion
by recognizing that the spouses had effectuated separate domiciles—the husband in
Connecticut and the wife in New York.225 It further held that the Connecticut divorce
was valid and enforceable within the state of Connecticut.226 At the same time,
however, the Court ruled that New York was not bound by the divorce, given that
the two had never established “matrimonial domicil”227 in Connecticut.228

219

Id. at 27. In so doing, the Court upheld the lower court which had found “that
Andrews had always retained his domicil in Massachusetts, had gone to Dakota for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, in fraud of the laws of Massachusetts, and with the intention
of returning to that state when the divorce was procured.” Id. at 18.
220
In explaining why the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not demand otherwise, the
Court noted that “although a particular provision of the Constitution may seemingly be
applicable, its controlling effect is limited by the essential nature of the powers of
government reserved to the states when the Constitution was adopted.” Id. at 34.
221
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 628 (1906) (Brown, J., dissenting).
222
Id. at 564.
223
Id. at 565.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 572 (noting that “the husband . . . at the time when the decree was rendered
[was] domiciled in [Connecticut, while] New York was the domicil of the wife . . . .”).
226
Id. (“[N]o question can arise on this record concerning the right of the state of
Connecticut within its borders to give effect to the decree of divorce rendered in favor of the
husband by the courts of Connecticut . . . .”).
227
Id. at 527, 570 (“Where the domicil of matrimony was in a particular state, and the
husband abandons his wife and goes into another state in order to avoid his marital
obligations, such other state to which the husband has wrongfully fled does not . . . become
a new domicil of matrimony.”).
228
Id. at 605–606 (“Without questioning the power of the state of Connecticut to
enforce within its own borders the decree of divorce which is here in issue, . . . we hold that
the decree of the court of Connecticut rendered under the circumstances stated was not
entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue of the full faith and
credit clause.”).
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The Court believed this resolution necessary, given that “if one government,
because of its authority over its own citizens has the right to dissolve the marriage
tie as to the citizen of another jurisdiction, it must follow that no government
possesses as to its own citizens, power over the marriage relation and its
dissolution.”229 Further, the Court introduced the idea that marital fault somehow
played a role in divorce jurisdiction, noting that New York could constitutionally
disregard the Connecticut divorce given that Mr. Haddock’s domicile there flowed
directly from his abandonment of his wife.230 As a result, the decision resulted in a
situation whereby the couple was legally married in New York yet was legally
divorced in Connecticut. Ruling as it did, the Court effectively went back on a key
observation it had made in Atherton—namely, that “[a] husband without a wife, or
a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.”231 Four justices dissented in
Haddock, with Justice Holmes characterizing the majority opinion as one that “not
only reverses a previous well-considered decision of this court, but is likely to cause
considerable disaster to innocent persons, and to bastardize children hitherto
supposed to be the offspring of lawful marriage.”232
Haddock did indeed engender a great deal of confusion, and “[c]riticisms of it
grew stronger over the years as the rules and exceptions [it] spawned . . . grew
steadily more complicated.”233 In an attempt to synthesize these various opinions,
one commentator described the uncertainty of the governing rule as follows: “a state
was not compelled to give full faith and credit to a divorce decree unless the
rendering state had as minimum contacts the domicil of one of the parties plus
‘something else.’”234 Nonetheless, it would take over thirty years before the Court
would begin to right the ship, which it first attempted to do in 1938 with Davis v.
Davis.235 There, Mark and Maude Davis were married in Washington D.C., where
they resided as husband and wife.236 Eventually, the two legally separated, and a
D.C. court ordered Mark to pay alimony.237 Mark subsequently moved to Virginia,
where he secured a divorce on the basis of desertion.238 In so doing, he alleged that
he had resided in Virginia for the one-year period required to establish domicile.239

229

Id. at 573.
Id. at 571 (“[I]f the husband . . . abandons their domicil and his wife, to get rid of all
those conjugal obligations which the marriage relation imposes upon him, . . . he yields up
that power and authority over her which alone makes his domicil hers.”) (quoting Barber v.
Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 595 (1858)).
231
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 162 (1901).
232
201 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
233
Estin, supra note 199, at 389.
234
Sumner, supra note 3, at 5 (emphasis added).
235
305 U.S. 32 (1938).
236
Id. at 35.
237
Mark had received a legal separation on the grounds of cruelty in D.C., where
“absolute divorce was not then permitted for desertion or cruelty.” Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 36.
230
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Maude appeared specially to contest jurisdiction but was unsuccessful.240 Mark then
attempted to use the Virginia divorce to modify the earlier judgment of the D.C.
court regarding alimony.241 Citing Haddock, the D.C. court refused to recognize the
Virginia divorce.242 On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged the conflicting
tests for “matrimonial domicil” that had arisen post-Haddock but nonetheless
refused to offer any clarification, instead stating that the case before it did not
warrant doing so.243 Instead, the Court distinguished Davis on the basis that Maude,
unlike the wife in Haddock, had received notice of the Virginia divorce and had even
participated in it to a limited degree, apparently rejecting the argument that Maude
had only appeared for purposes of contesting jurisdiction.244 On that basis, the Court
held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the D.C. court to give effect to
the husband’s foreign divorce.
Four years later, the Court would go even further and explicitly overrule
Haddock. The case was Williams v. State of North Carolina245—typically referred
to as Williams I—and it involved a North Carolina man and woman who both
traveled to Nevada, stayed there for the required six weeks, and then divorced their
respective spouses. The pair then promptly married one another and returned to
North Carolina.246 Upon their return, they were arrested and convicted of bigamous
cohabitation.247 In challenging their convictions, the case made its way to the
Supreme Court, which was asked to determine “whether a decree of divorce granted
in a state which is not the state of matrimonial domicile, in which the defendant is
not domiciled, and in which the defendant is not personally served with process and
makes no appearance is entitled to obligatory recognition in other states.”248 The
Court ruled that it was, and in the process overruled Haddock, which according to
240
Id. (“Process of the Virginia court was served personally upon the respondent in the
District of Columbia. She filed a plea stating that she appeared ‘specially and for no other
purpose than to file this plea to the jurisdiction of the court.’”).
241
Id. at 37–38.
242
According to the lower court: “It was necessary . . . under Haddock v. Haddock . . .
that Virginia be the last matrimonial domicil of the parties or, if not, that the wife be subjected
to the jurisdiction of the court [below], either by personal service within [Virginia], or by
voluntary appearance and participation in the suit.” Id. at 39 (internal quotes omitted).
243
Id. at 41 (noting that, although a single definition for “matrimonial domicil” both “is
not to be found; it need not be attempted here”).
244
Id. at 43 (“Plainly her plea and conduct in the Virginia court cannot be regarded as
special appearance merely to challenge jurisdiction. . . [and as such,] she submitted herself
to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court and is bound by its determination that it had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties.”).
245
317 U.S. 287 (1942).
246
Id. at 290.
247
North Carolina’s criminal code provided as follows: “If any person, being married,
shall contract a marriage with any other person outside of this state . . . and shall thereafter
cohabit with such person in this state, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished as
in cases of bigamy.” See State v. Williams, 17 S.E.2d 769, 774 (N.C. 1941) (quoting statue).
248
See Estin, supra note 199, at 397 (quoting North Carolina’s brief in opposition to
the petition for grant of certiorari).
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the Court improperly relied upon the concept of marital fault, or as the Court put it,
“the legalistic notion that where one spouse is wrongfully deserted he retains power
over the matrimonial domicil so that the domicil of the other spouse follows him
wherever he may go, while if he is to blame, he retains no such power.”249 Thus,
Williams I established that states are required to recognize ex parte divorces obtained
in a sister state whenever either party to the marriage established domicile in the
divorce-granting state.
Importantly, however, North Carolina did not initially challenge the
defendants’ claims that they had indeed established a valid Nevada domicile.250 As
a result, after the Court’s holding in Williams I, North Carolina once again
prosecuted the couple for bigamy by rejecting the validity of their Nevada domicile.
The couple challenged their convictions a second time, but this time the Supreme
Court sided with North Carolina. In what would come to be known as Williams II,
the Court held that a “[s]tate of domiciliary origin should not be bound by an
unfounded, even if not collusive, recital in the record of a court of another State.”251
According to the Court, “[t]he fact that the Nevada court found that they were
domiciled there is entitled to respect, and more . . . . But simply because the Nevada
court found that it had power to award a divorce decree cannot . . . foreclose
reexamination by another State.”252 Thus, whereas Williams I gave the promise of
clearer standards, Williams II took that away by holding that a party could be
divorced in one state (i.e., Nevada) yet still married in another (i.e., North Carolina).
For that reason, the Court’s holding in Williams II was controversial, prompting
vigorous dissents253 and posing particular difficulty for those seeking migratory
divorces. As Ann Laquer Estin explains:
After Williams II, a married individual who moved alone to a new state
and made a home there could be divorced in that state, without regard to
the divorce law of the “matrimonial domicile” and with little concern that
the divorce decree would be subject to challenge. For those seeking a
tourist divorce, however, Williams II reintroduced the risk of
complications.254
249
See Williams, 317 U.S. at 300 (“Whatever may be said as to the practical effect
which such a rule would have in clouding divorce decrees, the question as to where the fault
lies has no relevancy to the existence of state power in such circumstances.”).
250
See Estin, supra note 199, at 397–98 (noting that “the Nevada divorce decrees were
based on findings of domicile, and these findings had not been controverted in the North
Carolina proceeding . . . . ”).
251
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945).
252
Id. at 233–34.
253
Justice Rutledge, for instance, warned that “[o]nce again the ghost of ‘unitary
domicil’ returns on its perpetual round, in the guise of ‘jurisdictional fact,’ to upset
judgments, marriages, divorces, undermine the relations founded upon them, and make this
Court the unwilling and uncertain arbiter between the concededly valid laws and decrees of
sister states.” Id. at 244 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
254
Estin, supra note 199, at 404 (citation omitted).
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Thus, an unhappy spouse could venture to another state in search of more
favorable divorce laws, remain there long enough to meet its domicile requirements,
and yet still be prosecuted for bigamy upon returning “home.” Of course, for those
migratory divorces that were uncontested, few if any problems would arise. And,
indeed, the Supreme Court would soon issue two decisions that made migratory
divorce even easier for those couples that mutually consented to the divorce.
The first case to do so was the 1948 decision in Sherrer v. Sherrer.255 There,
Margaret Sherrer, who was married to Edward, left Massachusetts for what was
supposed to be a vacation in Florida. While there, however, she decided to file for
divorce after living in the state for four months.256 Edward, who still lived in
Massachusetts, nonetheless participated in the divorce proceeding, denying the
allegations.257 After the divorce was granted, Margaret remarried and returned to
Massachusetts with her new husband.258 At that point, Edward challenged the
validity of the Florida divorce, and the Massachusetts court agreed. Drawing upon
Williams II, the court held that “full faith and credit did not preclude the
Massachusetts courts from reexamining the finding of domicile made by the Florida
court.”259 The Supreme Court, however, reversed. It did so by noting that Edward
had participated in the Florida divorce.260 Thus, the Court distinguished the case
from Williams II and held that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Massachusetts
was bound by the Florida decree.261 In so ruling, the Court held that Edward had
already received “his day in court with respect to every issue involved in the
litigation, including the jurisdictional issue of petitioner’s domicile. Under such
circumstances, there is nothing in the concept of due process which demands that a
defendant be afforded a second opportunity to litigate the existence of jurisdictional
facts.”262
Three years later, the Court would hold that, in addition to the spouses
themselves, third parties were likewise foreclosed from relitigating a foreign divorce
in which both spouses had participated. In Johnson v. Muelberger,263 the facts were
somewhat similar to those of Sherrer. E. Bruce Johnson lived in New York, but in
255

334 U.S. 343 (1948).
Id. at 345.
257
Edward did contest the allegations that she had effectuated a Florida domicile, but
the Florida court rejected his arguments, and husband “failed to challenge the decree by
appeal.” Id. at 346.
258
Id. at 347.
259
Id. at 348.
260
Id. (“The respondent personally appeared in the Florida proceedings. Though his
attorney he filed pleadings denying the substantial allegations of petitioner’s complaint. It is
not suggested that his rights to introduce evidence and otherwise to conduct his defense were
in any degree impaired . . . .”).
261
Id. at 349 (“[U]nlike the situation presented in [Williams II], the finding of the
requisite jurisdictional facts was made in proceedings in which the defendant appeared and
participated.”).
262
Id. at 348.
263
340 U.S. 581 (1951).
256
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1942, his second wife traveled to Florida to divorce him.264 It was apparently
undisputed that his wife did not satisfy Florida’s residency requirement; however,
neither party contested that fact, and the divorce was granted.265 Mr. Johnson
subsequently remarried. Upon his death in 1945, his daughter from his first marriage
learned that her inheritance would be reduced based on the elective share that was
owed his third wife.266 The daughter then sought to invalidate the Florida divorce in
hopes of voiding her father’s third marriage. The lower court sided with the
daughter, holding that the divorce decree bound only the parties to the marriage and
that his daughter was thus free to contest the divorce.267 The Supreme Court
disagreed and held that, because Florida law would not have permitted the daughter
to attack the divorce decree in that state, “it cannot be attacked by them anywhere in
the Union. The Full Faith and Credit Clause forbids.”268 Taken together, Sherrer and
Johnson establish that lack of domicile is no bar to requiring a state to give full faith
and credit to a foreign divorce obtained by parties who consented to that court’s
jurisdiction.269
In the following years, the Court would introduce the concept of divisible
divorce, which in many ways represented “a compromise between the interests of
the spouse seeking an ex parte divorce and the spouse who was absent from the
proceeding.”270 Characterizing divorce as divisible simply means that a particular
state may not be able to adjudicate all of the issues arising out of a divorce
proceeding absent jurisdiction over both parties.271 But, as developed in the cases
264

Id. at 582.
As the Court pointed out, “the undisputed facts as developed in the New York
Surrogate’s hearing show that she did not comply with the jurisdictional ninety-day residence
requirement [but] the decedent appeared by attorney . . . not questioning the allegations as to
residence in Florida.” Id.
266
Id. at 583.
267
Id.
268
Id. at 589.
269
See MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 87 (1951) (“[I]n the recent cases of
Sherrer v. Sherrer and Coe v. Coe, it [the Supreme Court] took the position that bona-fide
domicile was not a prerequisite to the exercise of divorce jurisdiction by a state, if both
husband and wife appeared in the divorce proceeding and went through the form of
controversy.”).
270
Estin, supra note 199, at 414.
271
See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957) (“Since the wife was not
subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada divorce court had no power to extinguish any right
which she had under the law of New York to financial support from her husband.”). As the
Court noted, “[i]t has long been the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a
personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.” Id.
This concept of divisible divorce was first articulated by the Court in Estin v. Estin where it
held that a husband who obtained an ex parte divorce in Nevada could not use the existence
of that divorce to avoid an alimony order his wife had obtained earlier in New York. 334
U.S. 541, 549 (1948) (“The result in this situation is to make the divorce divisible—to give
effect to the Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to make it ineffective on
the issue of alimony.”).
265
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discussed above, the Supreme Court had already established that parties were free
to travel to sister states to obtain a divorce, and—if they either established domicile
there or their spouses consented to that court’s jurisdiction—the resulting divorce
would essentially be unassailable in another state, including those states that only
permitted divorce on the narrowest grounds. Thus, the law of divorce had become
what an editorial in Chicago’s Daily News aptly described as “the rule of the naval
convoy in reverse. The speed of the convoy is the speed of the slowest ship; but from
now on, the speed of divorce will tend to be that of the fastest state.”272
B. Legislative Responses: Attempts to Nationalize Divorce
Over time, migratory divorce was no doubt seen as a blessing by countless
individuals who desired a divorce but were otherwise unable to obtain one. For other
Americans, however, the practice was a national scandal, with many going so far as
to describe it as an “evil”273 or, in one instance, a “mad race for sex freedom and
return to paganism.”274 Among those who shared such views, many of them turned
to the legislature in hopes of curing the problems posed by—in the words of one
court writing in 1859—“that large class of discontented or lecherous pilgrims
seeking the Mecca of divorce.”275 Thus, the purpose of this section is to chronicle 1)
those reform proposals, which included both constitutional amendments and
uniform laws, and 2) the reason none of them—despite repeated attempts—were
able to garner sufficient support to become law.
1. Proposals to Amend the Constitution
In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt implored Congress to amend the
Constitution to provide federal control over the laws of marriage and divorce. From
the words he used, it is clear the President viewed migratory divorce as a problem
that demanded such an extraordinary step:
I am well aware of how difficult it is to pass a constitutional amendment.
Nevertheless . . . [a]t present the wide differences in the laws of the
different States on this subject result in scandals and abuses; and surely
there is nothing so vitally essential to the welfare of the nation, nothing
around which the nation should so bend itself to throw every safeguard, as
the home life of the average citizen.276
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See Estin, supra note 199, at 401 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina: Editorial
Comment from the Lay Press, 29 A.B.A. J. 78 (1943)).
273
See infra notes 308 and 309 and accompanying text; see also W.O. Hart, Uniform
Divorce Laws, 28 COM. L. BULL. J. 137, 137 (1923) (“The great evil in divorce suits is what
is known as the migratory divorce . . . .”).
274
This Reno-vating Racket: An Editorial, RENO DIVORCE RACKET (1931), at 3.
275
McQuigg v. McQuigg, 13 Ind. 294, 313 (1859).
276
See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 146.
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Five years later, a young state senator from New York named Franklin D.
Roosevelt would make a similar argument when he introduced a resolution
supporting “the adoption of . . . an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, delegating to Congress power to establish uniform laws on the subject of
married persons throughout the United States.”277 In so doing, Roosevelt expressed
the opinion that “the divorce laws of Nevada and some other Western states are too
lax.”278
During the decades in which migratory divorce flourished, such calls for reform
were constant.279 In response, between the years 1884 and 1963, Congress would
propose over seventy-five constitutional amendments aimed at nationalizing the law
of divorce.280 Consider, for instance, the proposed 1921 amendment, which is
emblematic of the form these various proposals typically took: “The Congress shall
have power to establish uniform laws on the subject of marriage and divorce from
the bonds of matrimony throughout the United States.”281 Other proposals attempted
to go further and grant Congress even greater authority over domestic relations. For
instance, a 1923 proposed amendment provided that “[t]he Congress shall have
power to make laws, which shall be uniform throughout the United States, on
marriage and divorce, the legitimation of children, and the care and custody of
children affected by divorce.”282
Some proposals were motivated not only by migratory divorce but also by other
societal concerns pertaining to the law of marriage within the United States at that
time. For instance, a number of amendments outlawing polygamy were proposed
over the years, and several of those included language that would likewise federalize
divorce jurisdiction. For example, an 1887 proposal provided that: “Congress shall
have power to legislate upon the subjects of marriage and divorce by general laws
applicable alike to all the States and Territories, and neither bigamy nor polygamy
shall exist or be permitted within the United States or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”283 Similarly, the subject of interracial marriage made an appearance in
at least one of these amendments. Namely, a 1928 proposed amendment seemingly
grew out of concerns involving not only migratory divorce but also fears that the
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Id.
Id. at 147.
279
See Carriere, supra note 20, at 1742 (“Migratory divorce’s many harms provided an
impetus for two centuries of divorce reform, both conservative and liberal.”).
280
See generally Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United
States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 666–85 (2004) (compiling
all proposed amendments regarding marriage to the U.S. Constitution, including those
“relating to the evasion of state marriage or divorce laws” as well as those “relating to
Congress’s jurisdiction over divorce”); see also RILEY, supra note 39, at 111 (“[B]eginning
in 1884, at every session of Congress, members considered motions suggesting that the
Constitution be amended.”).
281
Stein, supra note 280, at 681 (citing H.R.J. Res. 83, 67th Cong. (1921)).
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BLAKE, supra note 11, at 149.
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Stein, supra note 280, at 669 (citing S.J. Res. 2, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1877)).
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Fourteenth Amendment might be interpreted to prohibit state restrictions on
interracial marriage:
The Congress shall have power to make laws, which shall be uniform
throughout the United States, on marriage and divorce, the legitimation of
children, and the care and custody of children affected by annulment of
marriage or by divorce, but the power to legislate concerning the relation
between persons of different races is hereby reserved to and may be
exercised by the several States.284
Finally, an 1899 proposal seemed designed to not only give Congress the power
to regulate divorce but also to establish a religious affiliation for the entire nation:
“The Congress, as the highest law-making power of a Christian nation, shall have
exclusive power to regulate marriage and divorce in the several States, Territories,
and the District of Columbia.”285
Despite the number of proposed amendments, “[n]one garnered enough support
to come to a vote.”286 Multiple reasons exist for this failure. First, there was concern
that giving Congress control over marriage and divorce would simply make it too
difficult for individuals to obtain a divorce.287 Over the years, a growing number of
people had started to recognize the value of divorce.288 For women, in particular,
divorce had come to be seen increasingly as a “solution to problems posed by
desertion, spousal abuse, or the laws of coverture.”289 Thus, many viewed “the
divorce mills [as] providing a needed service by countering the unjust laws that
prohibited individuals from exiting destructive unions in their home states.”290
Second, many conservatives feared that whatever rules Congress came up with
284

Id. at 683 (citing H.R.J. Res. 162, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928)).
Id. at 673 (citing S.J. Res. 40, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1899)).
286
See RILEY, supra note 39, at 111 (noting that none of the proposed amendments ever
“garnered enough support to come to a vote”).
287
See RILEY, supra note 39, at 118 (noting the fear some had that “restricted divorce
provisions . . . would hurt wives by reducing the ease of divorce, thus forcing wives to remain
in harmful marriages”). This point was particularly relevant when it came to a constitutional
amendment given that “[a]n amendment of this nature would interfere with the privacy of
the individual and the right of citizens to make decisions about their personal lives.” Id. at
111.
288
See BARBER, supra note 10, at 68 (“To many Americans, the increasing availability
and frequency of divorce was a sign of emancipation, not regression.”). Consider, for
instance, the words of William E. Carson, writing in 1915: “[I]t is clear that divorce is not in
itself a disease, but is a remedy for a disease.” WILLIAM E. CARSON, THE MARRIAGE REVOLT:
A STUDY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 461 (1915) (noting that “the increase of divorce is, in
reality, a healthy sign, proving, as it does, that people have become less tolerant of evils
which were once endured and for which divorce is the only remedy”).
289
Estin, supra note 199, at 392. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for instance, wrote in 1902
that “[t]he states that have more liberal divorce laws are for women today what Canada was
for the fugitive in the old days of slavery.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 150–51.
290
BARBER, supra note 10, at 68.
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regarding divorce, they likely would not be as restrictive as those currently operating
in some states, thus forcing some states to adopt more liberal divorce laws. After all,
during much of this time, New York still only permitted divorce on the grounds of
adultery,291 and South Carolina did not permit divorce at all between the years of
1878 and 1949.292 Although it was the “archaic laws”293 of states like these that many
believed were driving migratory divorce by incentivizing their citizens to seek
divorces elsewhere,294 the same states were nonetheless opposed to any attempt by
Congress to force them to relax those restrictions. As one representative from South
Carolina said, “Why should we be forced to lower our standard of morality because
you want to raise yours?”295
The final impediment to adopting a Constitutional amendment regarding
divorce was general concerns regarding state sovereignty. As expressed by an 1897
editorial in the New York Times, “a constitutional amendment would be ‘contrary to
the whole theory of the constitution and subversive of the principles upon which the
distinction between State and Federal jurisdiction is founded.’”296 Although some
were inspired by the positive benefits that had accrued as a result of the
Reconstruction Amendments,297 which had likewise diminished states’ rights, “most
Congressmen felt that the situation was not grave enough to justify increasing the
power of the federal government at the expense of the states.”298
As such, the last proposal to amend the Constitution to protect against
migratory divorce would come in 1963, providing that “[t]he laws of the State,
territory, Commonwealth or possession of the United States in which a marriage is
contracted shall be the controlling law in any proceeding for the dissolution of such
marriage instituted in any other State . . . .”299 Like all such proposals that had come
before it, it never even came up for a vote.300
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See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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DiFonzo, supra note 74, at 920.
296
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2. Attempts to Create Uniform Legislation
Divorce reformers were by no means ignorant of the challenges associated with
any attempt to amend the Constitution.301 As a result, contemporaneous with those
attempts were efforts aimed at voluntary action among the states, specifically
regarding uniform legislation prescribing divorce jurisdiction. In fact, as one
commentator describes, “uniformity was the single most talked about solution to the
divorce problem.”302 Leading that charge was New York, the state which stubbornly
maintained only one ground for divorce303 and, correspondingly, from which many
residents traveled to sister states to obtain a divorce.304 In 1889, New York Governor
David B. Hill called upon the legislature to create a “Commission for the Promotion
of Uniform Legislation in the United States.”305 Other states followed suit, and soon
the various commissions would join forces, becoming the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.306
The aim was to promulgate a uniform code relating to divorce that a large
number of states would adopt and, thus, “bring laws into greater harmony so as to
eliminate the attraction of divorce migration.”307 The first such proposal by the
National Conference came in 1900 when it issued a model statute intended to
“attack[] directly, and . . . effectively, three of the greatest evils, considered from a
legal standpoint, of the present condition of our various and conflicting divorce
laws.”308 The first such “evil” was “the scandal of migratory divorces,”309 and
indeed, the text suggests that much of the proposal was aimed at making such
divorces more difficult to obtain:

301
See BLAKE, supra note 11, at 141 (describing how reformers thought “all efforts to
secure the passage of a constitutional amendment would be ‘futile’”).
302
O’NEILL, supra note 296, at 252; see also PARKMAN, supra note 179, at 17 (“The
increased use of migratory divorces . . . created pressures for uniform laws throughout the
United States.”).
303
See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 79, at 560–64.
304
See, e.g., BLAKE, supra note 11, at 171 (“In 1935, it was estimated that transients
from New York and New Jersey were the parties in about three-fifths of Nevada’s divorce
cases.”).
305
RILEY, supra note 39, at 111.
306
Id. at 112 (“[T]he governors of Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and Michigan had appointed state commissions to study uniform divorce legislation.”). In
addition, Blake notes that, “by 1898, a total of thirty-two states and one territory were
cooperating in the movement.” BLAKE, supra note 11, at 137.
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PHILLIPS, supra note 34, at 161.
308
Tenth Annual Conference of State Commissioners for the Promotion of Uniformity
of Legislation in the United States, in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
CONFERENCE MEETING 5, 45 (1900).
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Id. Second was “the wrong of speedy decrees against absent defendants, who may
be ignorant of any suit pending” and third was “the Interstate confusion arising from some
few states forbidding remarriage, while a great majority of the states permit it.” Id.
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Section. 1. No divorce shall be granted for any cause arising prior to the
residence of the complainant or defendant in this State, which was not a
ground for divorce in the State where the cause arose.
Sec. 2. No person shall be entitled to a divorce for any cause arising in this
State, who has not had actual residence in this State for at least one year
next before bringing suit for divorce, with a bona fide intention of making
this State his or her permanent home.
Section 3. No person shall be entitled to a divorce for any cause arising
out of this State unless the complainant or defendant shall have resided
within this State for at least two years next before bringing suit for divorce,
with a bona fide intention of making this State his or her permanent
home.310
This first proposal dealt only with divorce jurisdiction and not the grounds upon
which states should condition a grant of divorce.311 When it came to that question,
the National Conference would not attempt to provide an answer until several years
later. The problem was the delegates’ inability to agree on what form a uniform
divorce standard should take. When they first met in Washington in 1906, it
appeared they did agree on quite a few issues: “a two-year residency requirement;
personal notification of a defendant rather than notification by publication; public
divorce hearings; and a one-year ban on remarriage.”312 On the subject of divorce
grounds, however, discussions broke down.313 After all, although the primary goal
was to encourage more liberal states to become more restrictive when it came to
permitting divorce, a model law would simultaneously require the most restrictive
states to become more permissive.314 As an editorial from the New York Tribune in
1906 put it: “States which have strict laws will hardly relax them so as to recognize
310

Id. at 44.
See Grossman, supra note 21, at 96 (noting how the 1900 proposal “purported to
deal only with divorce procedure”) (internal quotations omitted).
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RILEY, supra note 39, at 117.
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BLAKE, supra note 11, at 141–42 (describing the numerous disagreements that
emerged from proposals regarding the permissive grounds for divorce); PHILLIPS, supra note
34, at 157 (noting how the delegates “could not agree on a single divorce code that would be
acceptable to all the states”).
314
As Ann Laquer Estin explains:
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States with restrictive policies on divorce, armed with a series of powerful moral
and political arguments, had strong incentives to articulate and defend those
policies in the competition with other states over regulation of individual families.
Other states, with different moral and political views of divorce and different
economic interests or demographics, proved equally unwilling to yield.
Estin, supra note 199, at 419.
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six causes in place of one cause for divorce.”315 Those states knew that if they did
relax their requirements for obtaining a divorce, they would see a rise in their divorce
rate—a result thought “too dear a price to pay for uniformity.”316
In the end, the delegates seemingly compromised by recognizing six grounds,
but carefully pointing out that, while those six “seem to be in accordance with the
legislation of a large number of [states], this Congress, desiring to see the number
of causes reduced rather than increased, recommends that no additional causes
should be recognized in any state.”317 Further, in reference to the more conservative
divorce states like New York and South Carolina, the report concluded that “in those
states where causes are restricted, no change is called for.”318
When it came to when one state must recognize a divorce issued by a sister
state, the model statute read as follows:
Full faith and credit shall be given in all the courts of this state to a decree
of annulment of marriage or divorce by a court of competent jurisdiction
in another State, territory or possession of the United States when the
jurisdiction of such court was obtained in the manner and in substantial
conformity with the conditions prescribed in . . . this act . . . Provided, that
if any inhabitant of this state shall go into another state, territory or country
in order to obtain a decree of divorce for a cause which occurred while the
parties resided in this State, or for a cause which is not ground for divorce
under the laws of this state, a decree so obtained shall be of no force or
effect in this state.319
In fashioning such a proposal, nobody thought it realistic to expect divorce-mill
states to embrace any law that would make it more difficult to grant divorces. As
one critic of the push for uniform state laws put it, “not in a thousand years could
you move some of those Western States to reform their divorce laws.”320 Even so,
the proposal was even less successful than hoped, and ultimately only three states
adopted it.321
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Just as religion had earlier influenced each state’s approach to divorce,322 it
likewise posed a significant obstacle when it came to achieving uniformity. Around
the turn of the twentieth century, a number of religious leaders became actively
involved in the uniform law movement:
Episcopal Bishop William C. Doane of Albany, a strong supporter of New
York’s strict divorce law, spearheaded the organization of an Inter-Church
Conference on Marriage and Divorce that met in 1903 and included
representatives from approximately twenty-five religious denominations.
In 1904, the New York Times reported that the American Baptist Home
Mission Society had joined the growing list of religious groups favoring
uniform divorce law. In 1905, the New York Tribune noted that Bishop
Doane and a group of representatives from the Inter-Church Conference
had urged President Theodore Roosevelt to lend his support to the law of
legislative change.323
The problem, however, was that the different religions were just as incapable
as the states in agreeing upon what was acceptable when it came to divorce. As one
commentator describes: “The campaign for voluntary uniformity, although widely
applauded, was doomed from the start because different religious groups with
differing ideas on divorce dominated enough state legislatures to prevent the passage
of model laws.”324
Nonetheless, the calls for uniformity continued. Indeed, “[w]henever some
dramatic episode focused attention on the migratory divorce problem, newspaper
editorial writers would deplore the fact that there was no uniform national law of
marriage and divorce.”325 After unsuccessful proposals in 1928 and 1930,326 the
National Conference scored its biggest success in 1947 when it passed The Uniform
Divorce Recognition Act, the provisions of which attempted to incorporate the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Williams I and Williams II:327

322
See supra Section II.A.; see also Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time
to Sever the Knot, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1997) (“Given that settlers in different
parts of the country had different religious backgrounds, the grounds available for divorce
varied significantly from state to state.”).
323
RILEY, supra note 39, at 114.
324
O’NEILL, supra note 296, at 253.
325
BLAKE, supra note 11, at 133.
326
See Grossman, supra note 21, at 97. For instance, the 1930 proposal provided “that
no court would exercise divorce jurisdiction unless both parties were domiciled in the state
in which the court was located or, if only one party was, then the domicile must have
continued for one uninterrupted year prior to filing for divorce.” Id.
327
Id. at 100 (“The 1947 Uniform Divorce Recognition Act reflected the approach in
the two Williams opinions.”).
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Section 1: A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force
or effect in this state if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this
state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was commenced.
Section 2: Proof that a person hereafter obtaining a divorce from the bonds
of matrimony in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within
12 months before the commencement of the proceeding therefor, and
resumed residence in this state within 18 months after the date of the
person’s departure therefrom, or (b) at all times after the person’s
departure from this state and until the person’s return maintained a place
of residence within this state, shall be prima facie evidence that the person
was domiciled in this state when the divorce proceeding was
commenced.328
Even then, however, the proposed statute was only adopted in nine states,329
and those states rarely relied upon it.330 In fact, the National Conference would
ultimately withdraw the proposal due to it being “obsolete.”331
In the end, the 1947 proposal would be the final model statute on divorce
jurisdiction put forth. Of course, as outlined above,332 the Supreme Court by that
time had largely settled the constitutional standards regarding state recognition of
foreign divorce decrees and, thus, there existed considerably less space within which
state laws on that topic could operate.
IV. LASTING IMPACTS
Although migratory divorce may have come to an end in the late 1960s, its
impact on the law of domestic relations continues to this day. It is the position of
this Article, in fact, that in many ways, the migratory divorce era represents a
watershed period in the development of contemporary family law—one that courts,
policymakers, and contemporary family law scholars must be mindful of as they
328

See Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Association, 23 CONN. B.J. 98, 122
(1949) (quoting proposal).
329
See William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Linda A. Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1363, 1400 (1967) (“The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, framed to discourage rather
than encourage migration in pursuit of divorce, has been adopted by only nine states.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
330
See, e.g., Dietrich v. Dietrich, 261 P.2d 269 (Cal. 1953) (holding that, despite the
language of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, that defendant was estopped from
asserting the invalidity of the plaintiff’s Nevada divorce given that the defendant married the
plaintiff in California the day following the Nevada decree).
331
See Nancy G. Maxwell, Unification and Harmonization of Family Law Principles:
The United States Experience, in PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONISATION
OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 249, 265 (Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., 2003).
332
See supra Section III.A.
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confront a number of contemporary issues affecting families. Particularly relevant
are the complex social, legal, and political influences that contributed to the
phenomenon of migratory divorce, as well as the responses that either failed or
ultimately proved successful in addressing the resulting legal questions. To illustrate
the role this history continues to play in the law of domestic relations, this Part looks
at four themes found in contemporary family law debates, noting the connections
that each one shares with migratory divorce in general and also identifying some of
the specific legal inquiries currently taking place that may benefit from a greater
understanding of this historical period. Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article to posit solutions to all those contemporary debates, it is hoped that by
drawing these connections to migratory divorce, those actively engaged in those
debates will utilize this history to more effectively advance viable solutions to those
problems.
A. Individual Rights v. States’ Rights
Writing in 1881, the Supreme Court described state power concerning the law
of domestic relations as follows: “The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the
conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be
created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved.”333 One consequence of the
migratory divorce cases, however, was to forever alter that balance.334 Consider, for
instance, Justice Black’s 1945 dissent in Williams II, where he noted that the
“Constitution preserves an area of individual freedom which the state has no right to
abridge.”335 For that reason, Black disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that
North Carolina could second-guess Nevada’s adjudication of domicile, noting that
“[t]he flavor of the Court’s opinion is that a state has supreme power to control its
domiciliaries’ conduct wherever they go and that the state may prohibit them from
getting a divorce in another state.”336 As such, Black criticized the majority opinion
as resting on “a restriction of individual as opposed to state rights.”337
Although only a minority view at the time of the two Williams cases, one of the
lasting legacies of migratory divorce and the Supreme Court cases it spawned is the
idea that divorce is not so much an issue of state sovereignty but is more so one of
individual rights. As Ann Laquer Estin explains, those cases “resolved a longstanding federalism problem by redefining the scope of state power over marital
status . . . fundamentally alter[ing] state power over the family by extending to
individuals greater control over their marital status.”338 Thus, whereas family law
333

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1878).
See Estin, supra note 199, at 381 (noting how the migratory divorce cases
“fundamentally altered state power over the family be extending to individuals greater
control over their marital status”).
335
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 267 n.8 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
336
Id.
337
Id. at 267 n.8, 262 (“The fact that two people will be deprived of their constitutional
rights impels me to protest as vigorously as I can against affirmance of these convictions.”).
338
Estin, supra note 199, at 381.
334

338

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

was once considered to be entirely an issue of state control,339 there now existed a
“growing emphasis on privacy and individual rights.”340 Indeed, looking at the
migratory divorce cases, the Court’s earliest decisions focused much more on the
states’ right to control the marital status of their citizens.341 By the end, however,
“marital status had become an aspect of personhood, and the right to change that
status became a privilege of national citizenship.”342 Consider, for instance, the
Sherrer and Johnson decisions,343 which in essence permitted divorce by mutual
consent of the parties.344 By 1971, the Supreme Court would go even further,
characterizing divorce proceedings as “the adjustment of a fundamental human
relationship.”345
The impact of that shift lives on today and has spawned a whole host of complex
questions regarding the family. First, as one commentator explains, “[g]reater
solicitude for individual prerogatives in the area of family relations can be identified
in the Court’s post-Williams II decisions, which base personal jurisdiction for
custody and child support actions on in personam jurisdiction instead of
domicile.”346 But such reverberations extend much further than simply the
incidences of legal divorce. In the decades that followed, the Supreme Court would
begin focusing on the personal liberty interests at play in various aspects of domestic
relations law. In the process, the law of the family, which had once been seen as
entirely the province of state law, would become increasingly subject to
constitutional constraints. Consider, for instance, cases like Griswold v.
Connecticut347 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,348 which ruled unconstitutional state
restrictions on contraception. In turn, those cases gave rise to a fundamental right to

339
Steven Mintz, Children, Families and the State: American Family Law in Historical
Perspective, 69 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 635, 648 (1992) (describing how the law once “viewed
families as instruments of the state”).
340
Id. at 636.
341
See, e.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 31 (1903) (holding that to say
Massachusetts was required to recognize the foreign divorce would undermine the “authority
of the state of Massachusetts to legislate over a subject inherently domestic in its nature and
upon which the existence of civilized society depends”); see also Sumner, supra note 3, at 2
(noting how those cases seemingly evinced “greater concern over the states’ interests than
there was with the desires, rights and status of individuals”).
342
Estin, supra note 199, at 425.
343
See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951); Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
344
Estin, supra note 199, at 409 (describing how the two cases “appeared to have
ratified” the understanding “that despite the stringencies of the law on the books, the law in
fact offered opportunities for couples to divorce by mutual agreement”).
345
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
346
Nick Tarasen, Untangling the Knot: Finding A Forum for Same-Sex Divorces in the
State of Celebration, 78 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1585, 1612 (2011).
347
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
348
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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privacy,349 upon which the Court would subsequently build in Roe v. Wade350 and
Lawrence v. Texas351 to strike down abortion restrictions and laws criminalizing
sodomy, respectively. During this time, the Court would likewise recognize other
fundamental rights in the realm of family law, including parents’ rights to direct the
upbringing of their children352 and the right to marry the person of one’s choice.353
In many respects, then, the phenomenon of migratory divorce opened the door
to the law of domestic relations taking on increasing constitutional dimensions, and
it is that legacy with which the law must continue to wrestle today. One particular
aspect that continues to fuel these difficult questions is the Court’s willingness to
decouple family law protections from overly formalistic state definitions of
“family.” As one commentator has described, the “new notions of privacy, sexual
equality and children’s rights produced a revolution in American family law”—one
that has prompted “a gradual erosion in the traditional conception of the nuclear
family as a legal entity with its own distinctive rights.”354 Consider, for instance,
Eisenstadt, where the Court held that the right to contraception likewise
encompasses unmarried individuals,355 or Levy v. Louisiana, where the Court began
to strike down state laws that discriminated against nonmarital children.356 Building
on these precedents, both courts and scholars continue to address related questions
of whether and to what extent family law protections should extend to those who
fail to satisfy the legal definitions of “spouse” or “child.” For example, a number of
legal commentators are engaged with questions involving whether cohabitants are,
despite not being married, nonetheless entitled to family law protections.357 Others
349
See Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 77
(1985) (describing the right of privacy as being “recognized and protected in” Griswold and
Eisenstadt).
350
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
351
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
352
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).
353
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.”);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 666 (2015) (“There is dignity in the bond between two
men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound
choices.”).
354
Mintz, supra note 339, at 653.
355
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“[W]hatever the rights of the
individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried
and the married alike.”).
356
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that “[l]egitimacy or illegitimacy
of birth has no relation” to the right at issue).
357
See, e.g., Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017)
(calling “for moving beyond the marriage-nonmarriage dyad in allocating property rights
between individuals who are not, or have not been, married”); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A
Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1509 (2016) (noting that “states have
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are engaged with the complicated question of whether a person is entitled to the
constitutional protections afforded parents when that person is neither the child’s
biological nor adoptive parent.358
Beyond expanding family law protections to those who might not have
traditionally qualified as “family,” there is the related question of whether those who
already meet those definitions might nonetheless be entitled to greater rights than
have historically been recognized. Consider, for instance, the question of whether
children might enjoy constitutional rights independent of their parents’ wishes and
directives. The Supreme Court decisions in the context of abortion suggest that the
answer is yes,359 but there are some who argue that children enjoy individual rights
that extend even further.360 Similarly, the degree to which grandparents might enjoy
constitutional protections vis-à-vis their grandchildren is a question that the Supreme
Court has explored but never answered.361 As contemporary legal minds continue
routinely responded to the legalization of same-sex marriage by eliminating their nonmarital
statuses” and discussing the harms that have resulted); Lawrence W. Waggoner, With
Marriage on the Decline and Cohabitation on the Rise, What About Marital Rights for
Unmarried Partners?, 41 ACTEC L.J. 49, 50 (2015) (arguing that “cohabiting couples
whose relationship shows that they are (or were) deeply committed to one another [should
be treated] as married in fact”).
358
See, e.g., Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483,
1491 (2018) (arguing “for a definition of constitutional parenthood that accounts not only
for those who share a biological connection to the child, but also those who were the intended
parents of the resulting child, regardless of biology”); Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of
Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261, 261 (2020) (challenging “the conventional assumption
that the Constitution protects only biological parent-child relationships and makes an
affirmative case for constitutional protection for nonbiological parents”); David D. Meyer,
The Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 860
(2006) (“[T]he circumstances that enabled the law’s tidy assumptions linking parenthood
with biology and adoption have collapsed.”).
359
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (“Our
cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor seeking an abortion
to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial
bypass procedure.”).
360
See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127
YALE L.J. 1448, 1453 (2018) (arguing for what the authors describe as “a direct departure
from existing constitutional law,” a new approach to children’s rights which “would
recognize children’s affirmative rights as children to certain goods and services essential to
furthering their broader interests”); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The
Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53
MD. L. REV. 358, 362 (1994) (arguing “that the law should accord children an independent
liberty interest in their relationships with both ‘legal parents’ and ‘nonlegal parents’
irrespective of biological ties”).
361
In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court ruled against grandparents seeking greater
visitation on the basis that the Washington statute upon which they relied was overly broad.
530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000). The Court, however, explicitly did not address the question of
“whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a
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analyzing these and related questions, it is helpful to remember the story of
migratory divorce. Given the impetus it provided for recognizing the constitutional
dimensions afforded individual members of a “family” and the resulting doctrines
that flow from such recognition, that era provides a number of invaluable tools for
analyzing these contemporary tensions between family law and individual rights.
B. Societal Evolution, Self-Correction, and Enduring Harm
One of the biggest influences behind the rise in migratory divorce was quite
simply the fact many states refused to provide the legal remedy that their citizens
longed for.362 Specifically, divorce became more socially acceptable once people
realized the advantages that came from dissolving marriages that were broken.363
Thus, when they could not obtain the relief that they desired in their home states,
people naturally began to look for relief elsewhere. Thus, as one judge, writing in
1942, would characterize it, those who traveled to other states in search of divorce
were simply “the victims of a legal system of divorce at war with social
convention.”364 And, after decades of debating the social desirability of migratory
divorce and countless attempts to curb it, the practice instead ended as a result of—
in the words of Joanna Grossman—“a social movement that perhaps unexpectedly
produced virtually uniform laws of divorce: the no-fault revolution. The revolution
did not come about because of the desire for uniformity; uniformity, rather, was an
unintended byproduct of a percolating demand for easier, less costly, and more
honest divorce.”365
The lesson to be derived here is that the law of domestic relations is essentially
driven by the public’s evolving conceptions of family. And to the extent the law is
slow to recognize such change, societal forces will eventually force a self-correction.
In this regard, migratory divorce was certainly not the last example of this
phenomenon. Consider, for instance, the degree to which the law completely
reversed course when it came to the legality of prenuptial agreements. Originally
dismissed as violative of public policy, courts were unwilling to enforce any such
agreements that contemplated the possibility of divorce.366 However, as social
acceptance for cohabitation rose and—at the same time—people became
increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of control spouses had regarding property
showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting
visitation.” Id. at 73.
362
See Garfield, supra note 19, at 504 (describing migratory divorce as “a predictable
consequence of overly restrictive divorce laws”); see also supra notes 72–75 and
accompanying text.
363
See supra notes 286–288 and accompanying text.
364
Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F.2d 497, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
365
Grossman, supra note 21, at 97.
366
Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 150 (1998)
(“Until the mid-1970s, most American courts held that premarital agreements and other
contracts made ‘in contemplation of divorce’ were unenforceable as against public policy.”).
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division at divorce, more couples opted to forego marriage and not risk the financial
consequences that would follow a divorce.367 In response, courts soon began taking
a different position. Given the states’ interest in encouraging marriage,368 courts in
the early 1970s began upholding the agreements.369 Today such agreements are
permitted in every state.370
To point out that family law will eventually catch up with the reality of
American lives is hardly revolutionary; however, that is not the point. Instead, the
principle to be gleaned from the example set by migratory divorce is that family law
must be vigilant when it comes to recognizing areas in which it is out of sync. After
all, the fact that the law will eventually self-correct is of little comfort to those who
are adversely impacted by the law prior to that rectification. Consider, for instance,
the plaintiffs in Williams who were ultimately sentenced to prison terms simply by
virtue of having received a divorce in Nevada.371 More generally, consider those
who were trapped in broken marriages because their states essentially denied them
the opportunity to obtain a divorce and a migratory divorce was not an economically
feasible option. Similar harms would have befallen those who, prior to the time states
changed their minds about prenuptial agreements, entered into a marriage thinking
they were protected by a contract that was ultimately deemed unenforceable. Or, for
a more contemporary example, consider that there were countless same-sex
relationships that never obtained the protections of marriage simply because those
relationships ended—either through death or informal dissolution—while awaiting
the legalization of same-sex marriage.372

367

See, e.g., Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 896 (1997) (describing how “[i]f previously married
individuals can’t contract to avoid the most unpleasant aspects of divorce, they might simply
choose not to get married”); Carolyn Counce, Family Law—Cary v. Cary: Antenuptial
Agreements Waiving or Limiting Alimony in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 1041, 1047
(1997) (pointing out that “the once prevalent societal constraints on living together without
marriage have largely disappeared,” and thus, couples might not remarry “if they had no
means of limiting the extent of their liability”).
368
See Matsumura, supra note 357, at 1556 (noting the “state’s interest in encouraging
marriage”).
369
The first court credited with doing so is the Supreme Court of Florida. See Posner
v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 387 (Fla. 1970). Other states soon followed Florida’s lead. See
Stephen T. Gary, To Agree or Not to Agree: Treatment of Postnuptial Agreements Under
Oklahoma Law, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 779, 784 n.27 (2011) (listing cases).
370
See Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 229, 254 (1994) (noting that “[a]ll states recognize, to some extent, the
enforceability of premarital agreements”).
371
Fortunately, the couple whose Nevada marriage gave rise to William I and William
II apparently escaped punishment. A story in Life magazine from 1945 reported that the two
“were granted a reprieve by the state on condition that they remarry in North Carolina,”
which they did in August of 1945. Fred Rodell, Divorce Muddle, LIFE, Sept. 3, 1945, at 90.
372
See Michael J. Higdon, While They Waited: Pre-Obergefell Lives and the Law of
Nonmarriage, 129 YALE L.J. F. 1, 1 (2019).
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Such considerations are important because there are currently a number of legal
issues relating to family law that arise from the law’s failure to recognize evolving
norms. To name but two are the laws relating to cohabitating couples and those
relating to parentage. In terms of cohabitation, couples who once lived with one
another outside of marriage did so at great peril, given that the law refused to afford
them any rights or remedies vis-à-vis one another.373 Although California in the
1970s opened the door for cohabitants to enter into enforceable agreements
regarding property distribution,374 most states continue to deny meaningful
protections to unmarried cohabitants. Indeed, a few states refuse to permit any
recovery whatsoever375 and, even among those that do, almost all condition recovery
on the existence of a contract—a formality few cohabitating couples would think to
undertake.376 This inertia on the law’s part might not be so concerning were it not
for the drastic increase in cohabitation over the last few decades.377 Thus, “[d]espite
the growing prevalence and cultural acceptance of this form of household, and wideranging support for providing a more diverse menu of family-configuration choices
beyond just marriage, legal protections for unmarried cohabitants are limited and
largely stagnant.”378 In terms of parentage, a number of scholars have pointed out
the mismatch that currently exists when it comes to how the law limits legal

373

Elizabeth Hodges, Will You “Contractually” Marry Me?, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAWS. 385, 398 (2010) (“[H]istorically cohabitation has had a negative connotation both
socially and legally.”).
374
See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112 (Cal. 1976) (holding that (1) express
contracts between cohabitants regarding property distribution were enforceable so long as
they were not conditioned “upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual
services” and (2) in the absence of an express agreement, recovery was likewise permitted
on the basis of implied contract and other equitable remedies).
375
See Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1983, 2020
(2018) (“Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana seem to go further, rejecting any claim arising from
a cohabitant relationship.”).
376
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 262 (2004) (describing the “contract-based”
approach as the “default framework”).
377
For instance, U.S. Census data reveals that not only did the number of cohabitating
couples increase seventy-two percent between 1990 and 2000, Christopher Marquis, Total
of Unmarried Couples Surged in 2000 U.S. Census, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/13/us/total-of-unmarried-couples-surged-in-2000-uscensus.html [https://perma.cc/ZC2Z-J7XS], but the number of cohabitating couples also
increased an additional forty-one percent between 2000 and 2010. DAPHNE LOFQUIST,
TERRY LUGAILA, MARTIN O’CONNELL & SARAH FELIZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD
AND FAMILIES: 2010 5 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JSW9-FDDK].
378
Restitution at Home: Unjust Compensation for Unmarried Cohabitants’ Domestic
Labor, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2124, 2124–25 (2020); see also supra note 357 and accompanying
text.
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parenthood to biological and adoptive parents.379 After all, with advances in assisted
reproduction, the legalization of same-sex marriage, and the increased frequency of
divorce, remarriage, and cohabitation, states now regularly encounter claims of
parental identity that thirty years ago would have been unimaginable.380 Yet, a
number of states have ignored the need for more nuanced laws regarding legal
parentage, and even among those that have made some changes, rights and
protections vary greatly from state to state.381
These are but two examples of contemporary family law debates that stem from
the laws’ failure to adjust to the new reality of American lives. Looking at the lessons
gleaned from the history of migratory divorce, lawmakers would be wise to
recognize that societal forces will almost always force a self-correction; however,
the longer the delay, the greater the number of lives and relationships will be forever
harmed. In the context of domestic relations law, such harm is particularly salient
given that the states’ obligation to protect individuals is one of family law’s “most
basic duties,”382 and in the words of Carl Schneider, who is credited with describing
this “protective function” of family law, doing so requires “protecting people from
physical harm, as the law of spouse and child abuse attempts to do, and from nonphysical harms, especially economic wrongs and psychological injuries.”383
C. Full Faith and Credit’s Limitations on State Exceptionalism
One of the most enduring lessons of the migratory divorce era was the degree
to which the Full Faith and Credit Clause effectively limits a state’s ability to refuse
recognition of a divorce decree issued by a sister state.384 Consider, for instance, an
early Massachusetts’ statute aimed at refusing enforcement of migratory divorces:
A divorce decreed in another State or country according to the laws
thereof, by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both the parties,
shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth; but if an inhabitant of
this Commonwealth goes into another State or country to obtain a divorce
for a cause which occurred here, while the parties resided here, or for a
cause which would not authorize a divorce by the laws of this
379
See Higdon, supra note 358; see also Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 656 (2008) (“[I]t is important to distill out
the different attributes of bionormativity in order to balance the competing priorities that
inform a conceptualization of parenthood.”); Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 119, 145 (2018) (arguing that “relationships should be considered
together with both intent and biology” in determining legal parentage).
380
See Higdon, supra note 358, at 1486 (“These changes have raised a number of
questions that, 30 years ago, would have been unheard of.”).
381
Id. at 1483.
382
Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
495, 497 (1992).
383
Id. (emphasis added).
384
See supra Section III.A.
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Commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no force or effect in this
Commonwealth.385
Although the Supreme Court would side with Massachusetts in 1903 on its
ability to legislate in this manner,386 the Court was forced to revisit the issue as the
constitutional questions arising from migratory divorce proved more complex.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court would rule that any state could dissolve the marital
status of one who was domiciled there, resulting in a divorce decree that sister states
were constitutionally required to recognize.387 In light of the Supreme Court’s
evolving jurisprudence on that issue, states were forced to accept that, realistically,
they had very little power when it came to defining what sorts of divorces they would
accept.
Similar debates concerning full faith and credit are playing out today. For
example, the issue of same-sex marriage raised the question of whether the Full Faith
and Credit Clause might extend beyond divorce to other familial statuses. By way
of background, in 1993, the Supreme Court of Hawaii suggested that its state
constitution might require the legalization of same-sex marriage,388 and this decision
quickly led to a nationwide panic.389 The concern was that such an action—
analogous to Nevada’s legalization of “quickie divorces”—would, in essence,
legalize same-sex marriage throughout the United States as Americans would travel
to Hawaii to wed their same-sex partners and then return home, demanding that their

385

statute).

See Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 29 (1903) (quoting the Massachusetts

386
See generally Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901); Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U.S. 14 (1903).
387
See generally Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942); State v. Williams, 17 S.E.2d 769 (N.C. 1941).
388
See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993). In that case, the court ruled that,
although there was no fundamental right to same-sex marriage, under the Hawaii
Constitution “sex is a ‘suspect category’ for purposes of equal protection analysis.” Id. For
that reason, the court held that the state’s discriminatory definition of marriage was
presumptively unconstitutional, and the state could only rebut that presumption by a showing
that “(a) the statute’s sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests and
(b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of the applicant couples’
constitutional rights.” Id.
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See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: The
Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1107 (2015) (“[W]hen the Hawaii Supreme
Court shocked the nation in 1993 and ruled in favor of Nina Baehr’s petition to marry her
female partner in Baehr v. Lewin, the issue of same-sex marriage drew prominent national
attention.”); David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian
Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM. L.Q. 523, 526 (1999) (noting how the
Hawaii opinion “stirred by far the most attention, for it led to the first appellate decision in
the United States suggesting that same-sex couples were constitutionally entitled to marry
and produced a seismic political reaction in Hawaii and the mainland”).
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state recognize the union.390 In response, a large number of states took preemptive
action and adopted constitutional amendments proclaiming that they would only
recognize marriages between one man and one woman.391 As public pressure grew,
the federal government also got involved, passing The Defense of Marriage Act in
1996.392 The act declared, in part, that no state would be required to recognize samesex marriages performed in other states.393
As the debate over same-sex marriage raged on, the question emerged as to
whether a state could, consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other states. The conventional
wisdom was that they could indeed refuse such recognition. Basically, it had long
been assumed that full faith and credit applied only to state judgments and not state
laws, with marriage—unlike divorces which are clearly judgments—falling more
into the latter category.394 As Steve Sanders explains, “[m]arriage, according to this
conventional wisdom, is simply another subject for ordinary lawmaking—no
different from things like workers’ compensation, insurance regulation, gas
royalties, or fishing licenses—where each state gets to decide policy for itself.”395
As such, most scholars were fairly confident that rules regarding choice of law, and
not the Full Faith and Credit Clause, would provide the proper guide for answering
questions regarding marriage recognition.396
390

See Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage—The Theoretical Perspective, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 105–06 (2003) (“[T]he combination of national citizenship (as
enforced by the Full Faith and Credit Clause) and the usual rules of recognizing marriages
validly celebrated in another state, meant that . . . there was a fear . . . that all other states
would have to recognize same-sex unions celebrated in Hawaii.”).
391
See William Buss & Emily Buss, Escaping the American Blot? A Comparative Look
at Federalism in Australia and the United States Through the Lens of Family Law, 48
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 105, 133 n.151 (2015) (“Within twelve years of the Hawaii Supreme
Court’s ruling, many states, including Hawaii, had added an express ban on same-sex
marriage to their laws, and a majority of these prohibitions were ultimately adopted as
constitutional amendments.”).
392
See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419–20 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
393
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (“No State . . . shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State . . . .”).
394
See Rebecca Aviel, Faithful Unions, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 721, 728–34 (2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (outlining the “conventional wisdom” of why the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is inapplicable when it comes to “interstate marriage conflicts”).
395
Steve Sanders, Is the Full Faith and Credit Clause Still “Irrelevant” to Same-Sex
Marriage?: Toward a Reconsideration of the Conventional Wisdom, 89 IND. L.J. 95, 96
(2014).
396
See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage
Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2222 n.18 (2005) (“As conflicts scholars must explain
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However, during oral arguments for Obergefell v. Hodges397—the case that
would ultimately make marriage equality a reality—something interesting
happened: the justices seemed quite critical of the idea that marriage recognition fell
outside the dictates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For instance, Justice Scalia
expressed skepticism that “there’s nothing in the Constitution that requires a state to
acknowledge . . . marriages in other states . . . .”398 Justice Ginsburg likewise
remarked that “it is odd, isn’t it, that a divorce does become the decree for the nation
. . . . [B]ut not the act of marriage.”399 Despite the intriguing nature of this line of
questioning and what it all might portend for the intersection of marriage and full
faith and credit going forward, oral argument marked the full extent to which the
Court would address the issue. When Kennedy’s opinion was released in June of
2015, it did not even mention the Full Faith and Credit Clause.400 Of course, given
the nature of the Court’s holding, it was unnecessary: “The Court . . . holds samesex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that
. . . there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex
marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”401
Nonetheless, the questions raised by the Court have given further life to an
excellent point raised by Joanna Grossman: “[t]he fact that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has not been invoked in the marriage context does not mean that it could not
be.”402 Indeed, a number of scholars have argued that it is applicable for a variety of
reasons.403 For example, some have pointed out that merely leaving marriage to a
choice of law analysis is problematic given such “analysis inherently favors state
interests over individual rights,”404 and marriage is increasingly seen as an individual
right—one subject to constitutional protection. Further, as a constitutional right,
some national uniformity is required if American law is to avoid the situation in
which individuals’ federal constitutional rights vary depending upon the state in
397

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
Transcript of Oral Argument on Question 2 at 27, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S.
644 (2015) (No. 14-556); see also Aviel, supra note 394, at 735 (internal quotations omitted).
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correct,” Scalia responded by saying, “Really?” Id.
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which they currently reside.405 Finally, the reason for affording divorce a different
analysis under the Full Faith and Credit Clause because it is a “judgment” is
increasingly seen as “a matter of formalism rather than a principled distinction based
on the Clause’s meaning and purposes.”406
Regardless of how that issue is ultimately resolved, the point here is that the
migratory divorce era is instructive in informing that future debate. Specifically,
when it comes to the role that the Full Faith and Credit Clause plays—not only in
the realm of marriage recognition but also in other state law determinations
regarding family—the migratory divorce cases provide a rich resource for
understanding the contours of that constitutional provision as well as the degree to
which it intersects with family law, which, as discussed above, has increasingly
taken on an individual rights focus.407
D. Achieving Uniformity in the Face of State Sovereignty
Beyond serving as a catalyst for more liberal divorce laws nationwide, one of
the most positive legacies of migratory divorce is the creation of the Uniform Law
Commission.408 As detailed earlier, state concerns over migratory divorce, coupled
with the realization that a constitutional amendment was unlikely, led to the
establishment of this body.409 The hope was that the National Conference might be
able to produce a model statute regarding divorce jurisdiction and recognition—one
that a critical mass of states might adopt so as to curtail an individual’s ability to
obtain a migratory divorce as well as the resulting advantage of doing so. In the end,
uniformity would come not from any model statute but the nation’s demand for
greater access to divorce, a demand that led to the eventual adoption of no-fault
divorce in all fifty states. Nonetheless, two important lessons regarding uniform laws
can be gleaned from that history. First, it became clear that where there is widespread
disagreement between the states regarding either the existence of a problem or how
that problem should best be addressed,410 uniform laws are unlikely to be effective.
405

See id. at 111 (“[W]hy is it rational to have two contradictory marriage-recognition
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ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert E. Emery ed., 2013).
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Second, and most relevant here, is the obverse point—when states do agree on
the underlying policy goals, uniform laws can offer considerable success when it
comes to the law of domestic relations, helping states realize societal benefits that
would have otherwise been impossible. Two of the most notable successes in that
regard are the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)411 and the Uniform
Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).412 The UIFSA, which
was promulgated in 1992, has been adopted in every state and has done much to
overcome the jurisdictional hurdles that once thwarted efforts at collecting child
support.413 At one point, parents encountered considerable difficulties obtaining and
enforcing child support orders when their state lacked jurisdiction over the other
parent.414 The UIFSA addressed that problem by creating a two-state proceeding
whereby a parent seeking child support would file the action in her jurisdiction, and
that court would then transfer the action to one that does have jurisdiction over the
other parent.415 As a result, the UIFSA has been credited with “successfully
effect[ing] major changes to child support enforcement and recognition throughout
the United States.”416
Whereas the UIFSA concerns child support, the UCCJEA targets child custody.
Prior to the UCCJEA, which was promulgated in 1997,417 “any state with a
substantial interest in the child’s welfare might take jurisdiction of a custody
case.”418 As a result, custody determinations regarding a single child could be spread
out over multiple jurisdictions, often leading to conflicting decrees.419 In addition,
411
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2015).
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415
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parents who were unhappy with one state’s determination could “seize and run,”420
taking the child to another state in hopes of receiving a more favorable decree. The
UCCJEA, which has been adopted in every state but Massachusetts, remedied these
problems by establishing a hierarchy of various bases for jurisdiction421 and, with
limited exceptions, provides exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to the state that made
the initial custody determination.422 As a result, the UCCJEA is today considered
“one of the more successful uniform acts concerning jurisdictional allocation.”423
The UCCJEA and the UIFSA are but two of the uniform codes promulgated by
the National Conference. Others include the Uniform Parentage Act (2002);424 the
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (2012);425 the Uniform
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act
(2007);426 and the Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection
Orders Act (2002).427 Although each has enjoyed varying degrees of success in terms
of how widely they have been adopted, there can be no doubt that uniform laws
allow for solutions that might otherwise be impossible in the face of state
sovereignty. Given that unique utility, there is no doubt that the National Conference
will continue to improve upon existing proposals as well as propose new uniform
laws to offer solutions better tailored to the evolving nature of the American family
and the growing understanding of the legal issues arising from those changes. For
instance, J. Thomas Oldham has proposed a “Uniform Equitable Distribution
420
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Jurisdiction Act” to deal with the degree to which divisible divorce promotes forum
shopping.428 Similarly, James Dwyer has proposed uniform laws dealing with such
issues as “Family Formation” and “Children’s Relationships with Nonparents,”
among others.429
As the National Conference continues its work and as family law scholars
continue to uncover additional areas in which uniform laws would be particularly
effective, the lessons of the migratory divorce era are uniquely instructive.
Specifically, it bears remembrance that, first, it was migratory divorce that prompted
states to even create and explore this potential solution to such problems.430 Second,
in studying this history, there are a number of lessons to be learned in reviewing the
proposals directed at ending migratory divorce, why those attempts ultimately failed,
and how to avoid those failures going forward.431
V. CONCLUSION
When contemporary legal scholars today reference the period of migratory
divorce, they have often described it as “little more than a historical curiosity.”432
And, as detailed above, it does indeed represent a fascinating time in American legal
history—one that spanned at least a hundred years,433 was responsible for numerous
Supreme Court decisions,434 and was a frequent topic of books, movies, and novels
of the time.435 However, the phenomenon of migratory divorce represents so much
more. As the United States considered how best to address the societal forces that
incentivized countless Americans to leave their homes for months on end simply to
try and escape a broken marriage, a number of themes came to the foreground—
themes that were instrumental in forming the foundation of the nation’s evolving
understanding of the law of domestic relations.436 Thus, keeping in mind the words
of Earl Warren, who once remarked that “[a]ll lawyers are . . . in some sense students
of legal history,”437 it is the position of this Article that migratory divorce is not
simply a historical oddity but instead remains an essential resource for scholars,
courts, and policymakers alike as they continue to grapple with the evolving
problems facing contemporary family law.
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